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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS
THE ROLE OF MERCOSUR IN THE POST COLD WAR SECURITY
CONTEXT OF THE SOUTHERN CONE OF THE AMERICAS
by
Alex Easdale
Florida International University, 1999
Miami, Florida
Professor Eduardo Gamarra, Major Professor
The purpose of this study is to determine whether the Southern Common Market
(MERCOSUR) plays a role in facilitating multilateral security mechanisms among its
members. The central question of this work asks whether regional integration results in
the establishment of cooperative security mechanisms.
The dependent variable involves multilateral security initiatives within the
MERCOSUR, in the present context of inter-American relations. The independent
variables include regional transitions to democracy, the regional strategic consequences
of the ending of the Cold War, and regional integration experiments. This work departs
from the stated central question to the particular case of international involvement in the
Paraguayan political crises of 1996 and 1999. The active intervention of Paraguay's
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largest MERCOSUR partners, Brazil and Argentina, in the course of these developments
is analyzed.
The evidence demonstrates that economic integration does not necessarily result
in the establishment of formal cooperative security mechanisms. In the present context of
inter-American relations, however, there exists a tendency toward multilateral regional
responses to internal threats to democracy as witnessed in the Paraguayan case. This
project shows that membership in a regional economic organization, as seen by the
ASEAN, European Union and MERCOSUR, enhances the establishment of common
security measures.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Ultimately, the significance and place of regionalism in post Cold War
security will be determined by its effectiveness in promoting the security
of participating states.'
On April 22, 1996 Paraguayan General Lino Oviedo gathered his troops some
twelve kilometers south of Asuncion and declared himself in rebellion against the
President of the Republic, Juan Carlos Wasmosy, in an attempt to overthrow him. This
extreme action was rooted in a decree signed by Wasmosy that called for the forced
retirement of Oviedo, who also served as head of the armed forces of that country.2 The
immediate reaction against the coup attempt by Paraguay's Southern Common Market
(MERCOSUR) partners was unprecedented. The governments of Argentina, Brazil and
Uruguay gave their full support to Wasmosy and made it clear that democracy is a
fundamental condition for membership into the Southern Common Market
(MERCOSUR). Several other key players in the international community, such as the
Organization of American States (OAS) and the United States, also played an important
part during the institutional crisis. Of particular interest to this thesis is that Paraguay's
largest MERCOSUR trade partners intervened in this country's domestic political
situation to help preserve democratic governance. These occurrences may bring to light
curious parallels in the economic and security realms with respect to integration.
Evidence that will be later presented points to a pattern in which states may be utilizing
' Muthiah Alagappa, 1995, pp. 156-157.
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international economic organizations to further their and their neighbors' security
interests. Therefore, the central question of this project is whether, in the post-Cold War
context of international relations, regional economic integration will lead to the eventual
establishment of cooperative security mechanisms in the Southern Cone.
A fundamental assumption of this thesis is that in the post-Cold War era, the
rapid process of globalization has been the force behind the regional economic
integration experiments in Europe, Asia and Latin America. By globalization I refer to a
phenomenon that may be identified in the pronounced increase in production processes
and financial transaction flows across national borders, which are organized on a
transnational basis 3 Furthermore, globalization contains no necessary notion of
enhancing inter-state cooperation, and may indeed expose several limitations in the
structures of international economic governance. States are as a result faced with
declining autonomy over their economic policy agenda and seek to regain control. This,
in turn, may help explain declining support for multilateral experiments, and the
increased interest in bilateral and regional accords, which have accompanied
globalization.4 States, then, seek to integrate at the (sub) regional level. Taken a step
further, I will contend that in the post Cold War era, economic integration experiments in
Europe, Asia and Latin America may give rise to new forms of cooperative security. To
fully explain the relationship between new forms of security and economic experiments,
2 La Naci6n newspaper, Menem se solidarizd con Wasmosy, April 23, 1996.
3 Francisco Rojas Aravena, 1998: 13. See also Gautam Sen, 1999: 61-2. Sen argues that globalization
reflects to closer integration of the world economy as measured by trade/GNP ratios and international flows
of FDI (Foreign Direct Investment) and financial capital than does internationalization. He adds that in
contrast to national exports and imports of goods and services, the organization, flow and purview of FDI
and global capital, undertaken by transnational corporations, assume a global marketplace.
4 Notes from International Political Economy seminar, Professor Copeland. The theoretical framework
established in the first chapter discusses and defines, for the purposes of this work, regional integration.
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this thesis will examine the case of MERCOSUR, and particularly its role in the internal
security of Paraguay during two serious recent institutional crises: the 1996 Oviedo coup
attempt, and the 1999 [vice-president] Arga a assassination.
CHAPTER BREAKDOWN
This introductory chapter will first attempt to explain the broad relationship
between the nature of economic integration and cooperative security arrangements in the
post-Cold War era. Through a review of relevant literature, I will examine the
relationship between economic regionalism and cooperative security. As a point of
departure, the first chapter will provide a theoretical framework with relevant concepts
that are deemed important to understand the impact that the end of the Cold War and
other international processes are having at the state and regional level. The third section
will analyze whether the end of the Cold War has resulted in cooperative security
mechanisms in certain prominent economic regions, namely the European Union and the
APEC/ASEAN region.
The second chapter will put recent political and economic developments of the
Western Hemisphere into context. First, a brief overview of MERCOSUR will be
provided, and its institutional characteristics will be analyzed (given that formal dispute
settlement mechanisms are key to the success of any economic integration scheme).
Second, the post Cold War content of strategic-security issues in the Western Hemisphere
will be explored. Finally, this chapter will analyze the security implications of political-
economic integration in the Southern Cone. In doing so, current trends in the present
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context of civil-military relations will be analyzed, as will proposals for collective
defense in MERCOSUR.
The case study method will be utilized in the third chapter. Keeping in mind the
central question, recent political developments in Paraguay and their subsequent
repercussions will be discussed since they brought in other international actors. The
major events that merit attention are the March 1996 coup attempt by General Lino
Oviedo, and the institutional political crises that erupted with the March 1999
assassination of then Vice-President Luis Maria Argafa. The ongoing dilemma involving
unsuccessful Paraguayan attempts to extradite Oviedo, who has attained political asylum
in Argentina, is key given that this issue continues to hamper relations between these two
countries. A discussion of the so-called government-military-Colorado Party tripartite
ruling structure that was established during Alfredo Stroessner's dictatorship is deemed
necessary since it could be argued that Paraguayan politics have not necessarily moved
away from it.5 This is key to an analysis of the Paraguayan democratic process since
institutional crises in this country have resulted in the direct involvement of its main
MERCOSUR trading partners.
The concluding chapter of this project will discuss relevant trends presently
occurring in the Southern Cone. Certain setbacks in the relations between the
MERCOSUR countries will be analyzed, as the possibilities that this organization has for
success. I will also explore potential repercussions for democracy and regionalism that
certain trends, such as the militarization and privatization of police functions, may have
Mike Collier, 1998: 3. This citation comes from Collier's paper: Civil-Military Relations in Paraguay:
Business as Usual, which was written as a course requirement for Eduardo Gamarra's South American
Politics (CPO 6936) class.
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on these countries furthering their attempts at integration. Hence, the still undefined role
to be played by the region's militaries (in light of the conceptual broadening of the
definition of security) becomes a relevant issue regarding integration attempts by these
countries since generals with political ambitions such as Oviedo threaten processes to
deepen regional integration within a context of democracy. Thus, and in light of this
research, I will explain what the Paraguayan case tells us about MERCOSUR's role in
the establishment of cooperative security mechanisms among its members.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
INTEGRATION
The most striking impact of globalization on the state is precisely the
integration of internal and external functions, and, associated with that, the
increasing interaction between security policy and economic policy, both
of which now have an important internal and external dimension.6
In economic, environmental, political, and even military issues, governments increasingly
feel obliged to act together, thereby giving rise to an intricate pattern of cooperation and
competition. As a result, several constraints on a state's freedom of action arise 7 As a
result of the increasing difficulties governments face in trying to act alone, there is a
greater the need for policy coordination. Furthermore, and in this context, international
institutions place additional limitations on the practical options available to sovereign
states. "The net effect is a network of contacts, coalitions, and interactions within and
between national societies that escape the control of the central policy organs of
6 Edward L. Morse, 1970: 371-392.
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government."8 Put simply, the scope of central governmental institutions has narrowed
while societies are becoming increasingly interdependent.
It could be argued that interdependence exists and operates in a variety of ways,
among a range of participants in a political system, whether at the sub-national, national,
or international level.9 With respect to interdependence, Herbert Spiro gives the
following analysis:
Interdependence may be positive, as in the division of labor, or negative,
as in nuclear deterrence. Interdependence varies also with regard the
substance of the goods involved in the relationship, from labor, flows of
communications, travel and migration, and other human goods, through
commodities and other economic goods, to hostile, warring, or mutually
supportive weapons systems. 0
Interdependence should be contrasted from integration in that interdependence,
which implies the balance of acquired positions, both at the national and international
level, has a more static connotation."1 The concept of integration applies both to national
politics, in the form of socio-political integration required by the functioning of modern
societies, and to international politics, in the form of the supranational solution to the
problems that are encountered by single nation states. Moreover, integration applies to
conflicts of interests that may arise between the different actors involved.12 It is this
double dialectic of integration that makes it more com-prehensive and dynamic as a
concept, since it describes two processes linked together in a constant evolution towards
7 Joseph A. Camilleri, 1992: 29.
8 Ibid.
9 Herbert Spiro, 1974: 147-8.
10 Ibid. Spiro adds that complex interdependence can involve various members of a network repetitively in
its interactions only, or non-repetitively in several overlapping networks.
"1 Ionescu, 1974: 22-23. My italics.
12 Ibid.
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greater coherence.13 It is still noteworthy, however, that an opposite process to internal
and external integration has been occurring in several regions where relations are
fragmented and the sovereign exercise of power by a state becomes illegitimate in the
eyes of a certain region or national minority. 14 Not all states are adequate vehicles of
nationalist claims. "Many "nations" (as self-conscious ethnic units) are "entrapped"
within a sovereign space administered by a government that is controlled by a different
nation. Such a state may be autonomous vis-a-vis the external world, but its internal
legitimacy is constantly subject to interrogation, if not assault, by assertive national
minorities" 15
In discussing concepts such as interdependence and integration, it is deemed
necessary to analyze some interpretations of the nature of sovereignty in the present
context of international relations. The notion of sovereignty has more generally
expressed the idea that there is a final and absolute authority in the political community
and that no final absolute authority exists elsewhere.16 Like integration, sovereignty has
both an internal and external dimension. Internal sovereignty connotes the exercise of
supreme authority within the state's boundaries, whereas external sovereignty connotes
the legal equality of states, with no state subjecting itself to a higher external authority.
"Supremacy within and equality of status without are considered complementary and
13 Ibid. Ionescu insists that of the three concepts of sovereignty, interdependence and integration, which are
bound to coexist for a long time in the contemporary political world, integration has a more global
connotation, and is as a result more comprehensive and dynamic than the other two.
14 For example, the manner in which the former Soviet Republics split up, Yugoslavia during the course of
this decade and the very interesting case of Colombia whose central government does not have control of
part of that country's territory yet this country is a full member of the Andean Community, a regional
economic bloc. While such occurrences are prevalent and destabilizing, a thorough analysis of crises of
this nature is beyond the scope of this work.
15 Richard Falk, 1990: 62. His quotations.
16 Hinsley, 1986: 1.
7
mutually reinforcing manifestations of sovereign statehood."' 7  The external
(international) function of the state is inseparable from the internal (societal) one.18
Geoffrey L. Goodwin argues that although the concept of sovereignty can be
given several meanings, the most helpful is to treat it as an absolute and not a relative
concept. "In principle, it can only be one thing or another. If it is not separate and
supreme in constitutional terms, it lacks sovereignty."1 The operative word is principle;
and in principle, Goodwin is correct in stating that sovereignty cannot be eroded, only
extinguished. 0 In practice, however, sovereignty is a relative term, and governments are
in a constant process of negotiating the state's sovereignty.21 Furthermore, as the nature
of the state changes, due to processes such as globalization that may be altering the scope
and nature of the state in both its internal and external relations, the relativity of the
practice of sovereignty becomes apparent. Hence, the relationship between sovereignty
and the state becomes critical in trying to comprehend the relative/absolute dichotomy
surrounding the concept of sovereignty. F H. Hinsley offers the following summary of
the traditional relationship between sovereignty and the state:
The concept has been formulated when conditions have been emphasizing
the interdependence between the political society and the more precise
phenomenon of its government. It has been the source of greatest
preoccupation and contention when conditions have been producing rapid
changes in the scope of government or in the nature of society or in both.
It has been resisted or reviled - it could not be overlooked - when
conditions, by producing a close integration between society and
17 Joseph A. Camilleri and Jim Falk, 1992: 139.
" Ibid.
19 Goodwin, 1974: 115. His Italics.
20 Ibid.
21 See Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber 1996: 9-13. My italics. On page 11, they state that "rather
than proceeding from the assumption that all states are sovereign, we are interested in considering the
variety of ways in which states are constantly negotiating their sovereignty." See also Roxanne Lynn Doty
1996: 122. For example, Doty argues that practitioners of statecraft are ardently and continuously involved
in the construction of the nation.
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government or else producing a gap between society and government,
have inclined men to assume that government and community are identical
or else to insist that they ought to be. In a word, the origin and history of
the concept of sovereignty are closely linked with the nature, the origin
and the history of the state.22
States are not necessarily any less sovereign because they do not possess complete
freedom of action.23 "There is now considerable evidence, especially in the light of
recent trends, that international and transnational interaction is central to the organization
and distribution of economic and political power and greatly compounds the already
considerable ambiguity surrounding at every level the principle of sovereignty." 24
With respect to integration, an integrated community can mobilize much larger
capabilities for a wide range of different goals.25 "In other words, integration - and more
particularly political amalgation - aims at the creation of a wide range of general purpose
capabilities, often exceeding by an order of magnitude or more the capabilities of the
component states."26 Hence, the problem that states encounter in their practical loss of
capabilities in the face of the divergent demands that are placed upon it seems to be
resolved by integrating with other societies. Integration at the regional level is the main
interest of this project, and the possible consequences that regional economic integration
can have on the strategic outlook of the region.
SECURITY and REGIONALISM
In the era of economic transnationalization states are severely restricted in
their capacity to manage their domestic economies by the actions of other
2 Hinsley, 1986: 2.21 Ibid. p. 24. Camilleri quotes Hinsley.
24 Ibid. p. 26.
25 Deutsch, 1974: 181. Regarding
26 Ibid.
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states, more importantly by the behavior of non-state actors, perhaps most
importantly by the rapidly evolving structure of the world economy.
...Similar trends, albeit in more subtle form, are at work in the security
field where the state has traditionally prided itself on being the architect of
policy and on exercising a monopoly on the use of force.27
The state operates in a complex environment in which policy decisions, processes
and outcomes cut across state boundaries and in which the pattern of authority
corresponds less to the system of sovereign states, as has traditionally been the case.28 If
the current capitalist world economic structure is seen as being mainly responsible for
regional integration, then what is mainly responsible for current transnational trends in
the security field? In order to answer this question it becomes necessary to determine a
working definition for security, and how this definition has been altered after the Cold
War. An adequate definition for regionalism is needed as well.
The concept of security is politically powerful, weakly conceptualized and
increasingly contested. Ramesh Thakur contends that three questions may be raised by
way of preamble:
* Who are the referents of security: for whom is security intended - individuals,
groups, nation, state, region, world?
* What are the instruments of security: by what means is security to be achieved -
military, nuclear, political, diplomatic, economic?
* What are the costs of security: at what price to the economy and to social and political
values can security be achieved? 29
27 Carilleri and Falk, 1992: 139.
28 Ibid.
29 Ramesh Thakur, 1997: 52.
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The answers to these questions have changed since the end of the Cold War." For
instance, the concept of security has been broadened considerably to incorporate issues
outside of the military realm. This includes political, societal, economic and
environmental dimensions. "Moreover, the several dimensions are not treated
mechanistically, but holistically, with many linkages and some tension between them." 1
If one is to treat these dimensions of security holistically, the border between the
domestic and the international becomes increasingly irrelevant. Thakur suggests that we
may be undergoing a radical conceptual shift fromn national security, and its focus on the
military defense of the state, to human security with its emphasis on the individual's
welfare. 2 In this context, a distinction between the different levels of security becomes
necessary. Eduardo Gamarra and Douglas Kincaid offer the following definitions:
By national defense, we refer to the upholding of the sovereignty of the
national state and territory against external threats, usually although not
exclusively emanating from other states. Public security refers to the
maintenance of public order and the enforcement of laws. Citizen security
concerns the guarantees of specific rights pertaining to citizens as such,
including both civil and political rights. All three types of security, along
with institutional responsibilities and jurisdictions, are usually spelled out
in national constitutions and elaborated within legal frameworks. 3
30 Ibid. Thakur dates the end of the Cold War in the 1989-1991 period collectively, with the breaking down
of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the reunification of Germany in 1990, the Gulf War (1990-1991), and the
implosion of the Soviet Union in 1991.
32 Ibid. pp. 52-53. Thakur briefly defines these different dimensions of security: Military security is seen
as the defense of a state's citizens, territory and resources against external enemies. Political security
involves protection the organizational stability of states, systems of government and their legitimizing
ideologies. Economic security entails the maintenance of given levels of welfare and state power through
access to resources, finance and markets. Societal security concerns the maintenance of traditional patterns
of language, culture, religion, social order and communal identity within the context of evolutionary
change. Environmental security means the sustainability of natural ecosystems. My italics. Thakur cites
Barry Buzan's definition of military security. See also in Barry Buzan, 'New Patterns of Global Security in
the Twenty-first Century', International Affairs, vol. 67, no.3, July 1991, p. 433.
32 Ibid. p. 53.
3 Douglas Kincaid and Eduardo Gamarra, 1995: 2. My italics.
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With respect to regional security, Muthiah Alagappa points out that two related
developments may explain the current interest in security regionalism:
1. The regionalization of international security brought about by the termination of the
Soviet-American conflict and the ongoing changes (economics driven but accelerated
by the collapse of the former USSR) in the distribution of power. In the absence of
an overarching and overriding global-level security dynamic, domestic, bilateral and
regional dynamics of conflicts may become more salient and must be addressed on
their own terms.
2. The two global actors - the United States and the United Nations - have neither the
resources nor the political will to become involved in security problems in all areas of
the globe. 4
These two developments require regional states to assume greater responsibility for their
own security. Alagappa defines regionalism as "sustained cooperation, formal or
informal, among governments, non-governmental organizations or the private sector in
three or more contiguous countries for mutual gain."35 Regarding the advantages and
disadvantages of regional organizations in the security sphere, Ramesh Thakur
summarizes that:
4 Alagappa, 1995: 152-3. On page 154, Alagappa cites a report prepared on UN peacekeeping in the post-
Cold War era, where former Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali made the following statement: "the
security council has and will continue to have primary responsibility for maintaining international peace
and security, but regional action as a matter of decentralization, delegation and cooperation with the United
Nations could not only lighten the burden of the Council, but also contribute to a deeper sense of
participation, consensus and democratization in international affairs." See also Boutros Boutros Ghali,
Secretary General of the United Nations, An Agenda for Peace: Preventative Diplomacy, Peacemaking,
and Peace-Keeping, United Nations, 1992, pp. 36-7. With respect to the United States, a case in point may
be President Clinton's attitude towards the East Timor Crisis in Indonesia. When speaking to the press
about it, he emphasized on several occasions that the U.S. role should be minimal (logistical support) and
applauded efforts by Indonesia's neighbors, particularly Australia's role as mediator in the crisis. C-SPAN,
9-9-99
" Ibid. p. 158. Alagappa cites the following definitions of regionalism: Joseph Nye states that regionalism
'in a descriptive sense' is 'the formation of interstate associations or groupings on the basis of regions',
with regions being defined 'as a limited number of states linked by a geographical relationship and by a
degree of mutual interdependence'. See also International Regionalism, Little, Brown and Company,
Boston, 1968, p. vii. Donald J. Puchala and Stuart I. Fagan define regionalism as 'a collection of
procedures and techniques, set in particular attitudinal environments, by which governments and peoples
maximize mutual positive payoffs by exploiting their mutual interdependence'. See also in 'International
Politics in the 1970s: The Search for a Perspective', International Organization, vol. 28, no.2, Spring
1974, p. 259.
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Regional organizations would have the advantages of closeness to the
conflicts, deeper familiarity with the issues underlying the conflict and the
social and political contexts encasing them, and awareness of the urgency
to deal with the crisis at hand. The handicaps under which regional
arrangements operate include local rivalries, partisanship, the tendency to
replicate local power imbalances within the regional organizations, and the
fear of establishing precedents for intervention in the internal affairs of
member countries.
A partial answer to the question of what is responsible for current transnational
trends in the security field appears to be that increasing regional economic
interdependence, coupled with the impact of the end of the Cold War, often results in
cooperation in other areas such as security. While the implications of regional economic
interdependence should not be exaggerated, the development of policy networks, which
result from interdependence, can have an important influence on politico-security
relations.37 Generally, economic interdependence results in increased links between
societies and gains by many, but not all, of those involved in the transactions. "Thus,
economic interdependence and growth have complex and contradictory implications for
political relations and national security."38
While the potential exists that increased economic interaction enhances security,
it may also serve as a source of disputes since interdependence can create
vulnerabilities. 39 This is an important point to keep in mind as integration experiments in
the developing world such as MERCOSUR are analyzed. In this context, cooperation
36 Thakur, 1997: 71.
37 Charles E. Morrison, 1997: 123.
3 Ibid. p. 129.
3 Andrew Mack and Stuart Harris, 1997: 10. On page 19, they state that "interdependence may enhance
security traditionally defined (that is, the absence of interstate war), while at the same time providing new
instruments of coercion for the powerful to wield against the weak." This is an important point given the
uneven relations that often occur in the context of economic integration experiments.
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becomes a relevant concept. According to Robert Keohane, "cooperation should not be
viewed as the absence of conflict, but rather as a reaction to conflict or potential
conflict."4 Cooperation occurs when the policies implemented by one government are
viewed by its partners as the realization of their own objectives.41 Regarding inter-
governmental cooperation and its goals, Alagappa offers the following summary:
The goal of cooperation may be the facilitation of orderly interaction in a
given issue area, resolution of a substantive problem, collaboration to
enhance a set of values, or the power and influence of the collection in its
interaction with other states and organizations, all with the ultimate
purpose of enhancing the national well-being of participating states.4 2
According to this reasoning, cooperation can embrace a wide range of activities that
include collaboration, coordination and even integration in some issues areas, but not
political unification. "Cooperation under the label of regionalism is usually wide ranging
in terms of issue areas as well as goals, and it has a long time horizon."43
THE END OF THE COLD WAR: THE CASES OF WESTERN EUROPE AND
THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION
THE EUROPEAN UNION AND SECURITY
Whereas previously, both prior to the nuclear age and throughout the Cold
War, it was simple to define and plan for the protection of 'vital national
interests', in the post-Cold War world such threats and risks as do exist are
thought to stem above all from indirect causes such as economic chaos,
social and demographic instability and their attendant political
upheavals. 44
40 Robert O'Keohane, 1984: 54.
41 Ibid. pp. 51-2.
42 Alagappa, 1995: 158.
43 Ibid.
44 Jolyon Howorth, 1997: 28. His quotations. Writing about France, Howorth points out that "the principal
sources of tension in the post-Cold War world are now seen in France as stemming from disequilibria
between the rich areas of the world and the poor. Interdependence is perceived not simply as a feature of
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Highlighting the new European discourse is a conceptual shift from defense
policy and its overwhelming emphasis on military dimensions to a "broader
understanding of security which embraces economic and industrial policy as well as
diplomatic, cultural, educational and other dimensions." 45 The transformation of the
post-Cold War political order has required both a reconsideration of the nature of security
and of the threat posed to the Western European countries.46 While the terms security
and military security were generally used interchangeably during the Cold War, since
then the content of security has been broadened making security a much more ambiguous
concept.47 In the present transition period the rationales of the old security order are no
longer relevant, but a new security order has yet to emerge. 48  Reimund Seidelmann
argues that European policies face a three stage challenge:
1. Elaboration of a grand design for the new order.
2. Organization of political support for the design within and between European
countries.
3. Implementation of the design in terms of operational institutions and mechanisms and
terms of common political will, values and identity.49
At this stage, the role played by institutions becomes important. Of concern is
that the majority of European international organizations were developed in the aftermath
of the Second World War and during the Cold War, and that these were developed to
address the challenges of those times. Today's problems and geographic focus are
the economic and industrial systems of the advanced market economies, but also as a desirable foundation
for regional and international stability." Ibid.
as Ibid.
46 Emil Kirchner, 1995: 1.
47 Ibid. Kirchner points out that the NATO alliance has acknowledged that political, economic, and even
environmental concerns are displacing the military mission of the alliance. Ibid.
48 Reimund Seidelmann, 1995: 114.
49 Ibid.
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different.5 0 There is uncertainty as to which organizational framework should take
precedence in efforts by Western European countries to confront threats posed by the
altered post-Cold War international and regional environment. In the present European
era, the challenge of ethnic conflict in Eastern Europe and the objective of union building
in Western Europe are intertwined. "The character and scope of the new conflicts in
Europe, and the circumstances under which they have come about, had an impact on the
rationale of Western European integration."5' As pertaining the security role of the
European Union (EU) in this new context, Reinhardt Rummel poses that:
In many ways the response to potential conflict on their doorstep has been
a cold start for the west Europeans and their collective organizations. As
the EU, which was designed to cope primarily with controversies and
conflicting interests among its member states, moved into a position of
conflict management in Eastern Europe, a new type of policy mix was
required, new internal structures of decision-making, and a new level of
international sharing of responsibilities. 52
Those demands strengthened the idea of enriching the external component of the
European Community and of establishing a political union along with the economic
union. The Maastricht Treaty, in force since November 1, 1993, establishes the European
Union and codifies that idea. Among the proposed goals of the Maastricht Treaty is the
implementation of a security policy, including the eventual framing of a common defense
policy. "The Union is to request the Western European Union (WEU), which is
5 Abram and Antonia Handler Chayes, 1996: 7.
5 Reinhardt Rummel, 1996: 197. In Michael Welsh, 1996: 136, former European Community President
Delors is quoted on a speech made to the Institute of Strategic Studies in March 1991 as saying that "the
only option compatible with the complete vision of European Union is to insert a common security policy
into this framework... We must make it clear that what we are proposing is a single community as a logical
extension of the ambitions of European Union heralded by the Single European Act." Alastair Buchan
Memorial Lecture, March 7, 1991.
5 Ibid. pp. 197-8.
53 Ibid. p. 198.
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recognized as the military arm of the EU, to elaborate and implement decisions and
actions of the Union that have defense implications."5 4 With the end of the Cold War,
Europeans have been more prone to think in terms of equipping Europe with a defense
capability of its own. The changes that have occurred since 1989 has removed the all-
encompassing threat facing Western Europe and has enabled other groups to influence
policy outcomes, "hence placing defence issues back within the framework of legitimate
political debate and dispute."55
The Maastricht agreements establish the common recognition of the WEU as an
essential element of the union and that it should be viewed as a link between the EU and
the Atlantic Alliance. These agreements recognize that Europe's defense can no longer
simply depend on the U.S. dominated NATO alliance, and that the WEU offers a way out
of this. 56  The empirical reality, however, provides qualification to such optimism.
Despite the rhetoric of the EU treaty, progress in the defense sphere has been minimal.
"Moreover, to the extent that defense does come within the ambit of integration, the
pillared structure created in the Maastricht Treaty ensures not only that member states
take decisions by unanimity, but also that the supranational institutions have only a very
4 Ibid. pp. 200-1. Rummel poses that the provisions on defense are potentially important innovations in
the security sector of the unification process, though they will certainly need further qualification given the
new range of security tasks after the end of the Cold War. Ibid. It is worth noting that the WEU is a
European defense alliance founded in 1948, a year before NATO. Its operational responsibilities were soon
after transferred to NATO and it became a dormant organization. The WEU was reactivated in 1986 and
has since been developed as the European pillar of NATO. This organization has been found as the most
acceptable European defense institution to the U.S and the U.K. because it has no formal linkage with the
European Union. Moreover, in 1990, the French Prime Minister and German Chancellor agreed that an
organic link should be established between the U and the European Political Union (EPU). "One
consequence of the Franco-German proposal was a set of principles outlining a common foreign and
security policy (CFSP) in the draft treaty for European Political Union that included, inter alia, the
designation of the WEU as the operational a of EPU in defence related matters." Emil Kirchner, James
Sperling and Christoph Bluth, 1995: 13. See also in Michael Welsh, 1996: 3.
5 Anand Menon, 1997: 5-6.
56 Michael Welsh, 1996: 139.
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minor, consultative role to play.""7 The point to keep in mind here is that the direct role
played by the EU over national defense policy in its member states has been minimal, and
that European supranationality does not at this time apply to issues of national defense.
The EU has had an indirect impact on national policies, however. European
Union policies in areas other than defense have impinged on national defense policies.
For example, in order to meet the stringent criteria for monetary integration by 1998, and
in the absence of the Cold War, armaments programs have been cut back and armed
forces have been reduced in size throughout the EU countries. "Another way in which the
EU may have impacted indirectly on national policies is through the increased links it has
fostered between states in non-military areas." 8 The EU may play a role in broadening
concepts of security, altering the relative weight accorded to questions of purely military
security to perhaps facilitate military cooperation. Moreover, U.S. reluctance in
involving its military abroad, coupled with shrinking defense budgets among European
countries places a lot of pressure on single countries to achieve security objectives
alone.59 Freedman and Menon posit that while it may be tempting to assume then that the
EU will increase its role in defense issues, there are two reasons against defense
cooperation within the EU ambit. First is that states have displayed a tendency to choose
cooperative projects that limit the impact on national autonomy; secondly, EU
involvement in security issues has been limited due to alternative institutional structures
"Lawrence Freedman and Anand Menon, 1997: 156.
58 Ibid. pp. 156-7.
9 Ibid. pp. 157 & 160.
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that have been efficient and acceptable as cooperative mechanism, such as NATO .0
They explain that:
It would be incorrect to view the failure to achieve more within the EU
framework as indicative of a failure to respond to increasing pressure on
the state by practical steps towards enhanced institutionalized cooperation
and even integration. This has taken place within NATO. For the most
committed, however, the European project cannot be considered complete
until defence is fully included. 1
The comfort that Western European countries had in security cooperation within
the aegis of NATO appears to be over in light of the recent Kosovo war. On June 3, 1999
the leaders of fifteen European countries decided to make the EU a military power for the
first time in its history, with command headquarters, staffs and forces for its own
peacekeeping missions in future crisis like the one in Kosovo. According to a plan
announced at the European Union summit in Cologne, Germany, by late 2000 a single
foreign and security policy czar will speak for Europe and carry out the will of European
leaders.62 All fifteen leaders declared that "the union must have the capacity for
autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use
them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without
prejudice to actions by NATO."63 Logically, the European leaders decided to utilize the
WEU and its 60,000 troops, Eurocorps. The Eurocorps, they added, would be put at the
disposal of the new, more assertive Europe that is taking shape under the EU. 64 It would
seem then that a relationship between economic integration and security cooperation
60 Ibid. . 161.
61 Ibid. p. 162.
62 New York Times, 6-4-99, European Union Vows to Become Military Power.
63 Ibid.
" Ibid.
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exists in the context of the European Union and as a result of crises that have occurred in
an altered post-Cold War international structural environment.
THE CASE OF ASIAN-PACIFIC COOPERATION
Asian diplomacy, it is said, rests on reaching consensus between
competing interests; the idea of majority voting to resolve disagreements
is generally unacceptable. There is substantial evidence that Asian states
strongly prefer informal means of collaboration rather than the building of
elaborate institutional frameworks. Premature attempts to impose
institutionalisation on the region may be counterproductive. 5
In the Asia-Pacific region, economic interdependence seems to have been more a
consequence of reasonably good political relations than a cause of them. 66 Recently,
different types of multilateral networks have developed in the region. Some of these
networks are in the form of formal inter-governmental institutions (such as ASEAN,
APEC and the ASEAN Regional Forum), while others are overlapping 'second track'
networks, "intended to identify issues and develop solutions or means of coping to bring
to the attention of the formal governmental processes." 67 This process of institution
building arose first in the economic realm due to the sensitivities of the politico-security
realm. 68 U.S. and Chinese interests in the region were tantamount, and the smaller Asian
nations tittered between two powerful and ideologically opposed hegemonic powers.
Interestingly, and in that context, economics (and dealing with issues of interdependence)
65 Mack and Ravenhill, 1995: 14.
66 Morrison, 1997: 130.
67 Ibid. p. 131. APEC is the acronym for the Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation.
68 Ibid. . 132.
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to a great extent served as a cover for those actors who wanted to involve themselves in
political activity, but that could not explicitly state that this was the case.69
During the Cold War, the focus in the Asia-Pacific region most generally
regarded domestic security issues. Domestic threats were considered more serious than
external threats since the most pressing challenges that the newly independent states of
Southeast Asia had to deal with were ethnic separatism and communist insurgency.
With respect to cooperation, "the idea that pursuing economic engagement/enmeshment
strategies with adversaries, or potential adversaries, might be security-enhancing was not
taken very seriously in the Cold War era."71 The Cold War, coupled with the desire of
the communist regimes in China, North Korea and Vietnam to be self-reliant, ensured
that interdependence between these countries and the pro-Western nations in the region
remained at a low level.? "The end of the Cold War was thus a necessary condition for
the building of region-wide regimes in both the economic and security spheres." 7 1 In this
context then, "APEC can be seen not just as an economic organization, but as a post-Cold
War strategic partnership or link between Asia/Western Pacific and North America."74
69 Ibid. The Association of East Asian States (ASEAN) was created in 1967 by negotiations involving
mainly government officials from the member countries. The original membership includes: Brunei,
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, Recently, Vietnam has become a full
member. Morrison points out that "the key function of the new association was to cement a relationship
between the 'New Order' government in Indonesia and the more Western-oriented countries that were
already engaged in a cooperation scheme, the Association of Southeast Asia, comprised of Malaysia, the
Philippines, and Thailand." Ibid.
70 Amitav Acharya and Richard Stubbs, 1999: 123.
71 Stuart Harris and Andrew Mack, 1997: 1.
72 Andrew Mack and John Ravenhill, 1995: 4.
7 Ibid. Mack and Ravenhill point out that the dramatic growth in interdependence in the region, which saw
intraregional trade reach levels like those of the EU, happened (with the exception of ASEAN) in the
absence of organizations designed to reduce transaction costs. They argue that this reinforced demands for
the negotiation of these type of arrangements. Ibid. p. 5.
74 Morrison, 1997: 134-5. He points out that to a great extent, the ideas behind APEC came into being
through the operation of policy networks that were focused on issues arising out of interdependence, key
among these the conflictual elements such as U.S. - Japan trade conflicts.
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In the post-Cold War era, engagement is central to the security policies of the U.S. and
most regional states towards China, for example. Now, there is an increasing interest in
the security implications of economic interdependence 5  This ties into Keohane's
argument that cooperation should not be viewed as the absence of conflict, but as a
reaction to conflict or potential conflict.76
In the post-Cold War era, many of the internal sources of instability have lessened
since rapid economic growth has reduced the possibilities of domestic challenges to
regime legitimacy 77 At the present time, the Asia Pacific countries perceive the region's
shifting balance of power as the principal source of threat. "Southeast Asia's leaders
have expressed concerns that the end of the cold war order could be followed by strategic
competition among a host of powers, including conflicts previously suppressed by
superpower rivalry." 7 Moreover, interdependence (as seen by the growing irrelevance of
borders) is less evident in the region that in Europe, for instance. This may be the case
since regional economic integration is less advanced in East Asia than in other parts of
the world, and because of the relatively recent emergence of these countries from
colonialism and neo-colonialism.79 In practice, however, concerns with sovereignty have
not prevented these states from pursuing integrating economic policies, nor from
supporting regional organizations like APEC and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).80
75 Mack and Ravenhill, 1995: 2.
76 Robert O'Keohane, 1984: 54. See citation on page 14 of this work.
" Amitav Acharya and Richard Stubbs, 1999: 123. The authors add that "there has been a shift in the
traditional inward-looking view of security in the region. Now, external threats to national security are
receiving more attention, with a corresponding shift in their security posture from counter-insurgency to
conventional warfare." Ibid.
78 Ibid.
79 Stuart and Mack, 1997: 8.
80 Ibid. The ARF is a broad regional ministerial level dialogue on security issues, which has adopted the
APEC (Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation) and ASEAN formula of interim senior official meetings and
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The Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation forum was established at a ministerial
meeting in Canberra, Australia on November 1989." APEC has been the only formal
region-wide multilateral organization that deals with economic issues. While it has
resulted in greater interaction between the member economies and has seen some
institutionalization, this organization lacks clear dispute settlement mechanisms to
resolve conflicts. "In good part this is because of divisions along North-South lines
which have undermined the prospects for a clear consensus on the way forward for
APEC." For example, the East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC), which includes the
Asian members of APEC, has been incorporated into APEC but it is possible that it could
compete with APEC at some point in time.83
As regards cooperative security, the ARF is a pretty unique regional security
institution. Despite the fact that it has a strong representation from 'northern' countries,
agenda setting has been controlled by the developing states. Unsurprisingly, within the
ARF there are key differences between its Western and Asian members. For instance,
Australia and Canada call for rapid progress by the ARF in developing concrete measures
a work program. ARF emerged out of policy recommendations from the ASEAN-ISIS group, which is a
consortium of security and political economy oriented policy research institutions and involves public as
well as private sector input. Morrison, 1997: 133-135.
81 Acharya and Stubbs, 1999: 130. APEC membership includes the ASEAN states of the time - Brunei,
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand - and Australia, Canada, Chile, China, Hong
Kong, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, South Korea, Taiwan, and the U.S.
82 Ibid. The authors give as an example the U.S., Australian and Canadian intentions of using APEC as a
form in they can tie in as many regional economies as possible into an open, market-led, regional
arrangement that would undercut any trend toward protectionism in the global economy. Japan's opposing
view is that APEC should hold discussions and policy dialogues, attempt to develop a common
understanding on how to strengthen regional cooperation, and help with policy-making at the regional and
national levels.
83 Ibid. The EAEC is likely to emerge as an important forum for regional integration since these countries
share aspects of recent history, similar values and common approaches to their economies. Ibid. pp. 130-1.
84 Ibid. pp. 131-2. The ARF was established in July 1994. Its membership includes the seven ASEAN
states, Australia, Canada, China, the EU, Japan, Laos, New Guinea, New Zealand, Papua, South Korea, and
Russia.
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of security cooperation. Conversely, "the ASEAN states have adopted a much more
gradual, informal, and cautious approach to institution-building and explicitly rejected the
need to emulate Western models of security cooperation."85 In light of these differences,
it is questionable whether the ARF will able to provide practical solutions to regional
security problems.8 6 It is safe to say that it is much more difficult to come to a consensus
on issues that posit key fundamental differences in the viewpoints of member states of
organizations like APEC and ARF. This, it can be argued, is especially the case at the
broad regional level of APEC, which includes members from four different continents.
At the sub-regional level (ASEAN for example), economic integration and security
cooperation may be more attainable. Moreover, even though the apparent purpose for
establishing ASEAN was the promotion of economic, cultural and social cooperation of
its members, "its principal functions in the first quarter century of its existence were
related to the internal and external security of its member states." 7
With respect to linkages between the economic and security dimensions, a direct
relationship appears to exist between these dimensions in the current post-Cold War
environment of the Asia-Pacific region, particularly among the ASEAN states. It can
certainly be argued that a security community has been built in the ASEAN states, for
whom the non-use of force has become a norm in their relations.88 Even though some
have suggested that APEC be expanded to the security realm out right, this is not likely
* Ibid. p. 132. Moreover, the authors point out that China and the ASEAN states believe that the ARF
should not develop into a forum for promoting human rights and democracy because this will lead to the
interference of Western powers in their internal affairs. Ibid.
86 Ibid.
87 Mack and Ravenhill, 1995: 3.
88 Morrison, 1997: 133. According to Morrison, the expansion of ASEAN to include Vietnam, and
eventually the three remaining Southeast Asian countries that are non-members, "has logic from a political
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due to the membership of the Chinese Taipei, and the existence of ARF, which does deal
explicitly with security issues.i 9 Even though the limitations of ARF (the diversity and
number of its members for one) have been pointed out, this exercise has shown a
relationship, albeit an ambiguous one, between economic integration and security
cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region. A parallel could be drawn between the difficulties
of achieving more in the way of institution building within APEC, and the limited
progress that has been achieved in enacting the free trade area of the Americas proposal,
which was agreed upon by the 34 democratically elected nations of the Western
Hemisphere in 1994. A parallel could perhaps be drawn as well between MERCOSUR
and the ASEAN region, which has shown that progress in economic integration and
security regionalism may be more feasible at the sub-regional level. The preference for
informal negotiations and the consensus basis for decisions by the Asian countries is also
relevant. As will be pointed out in the next chapter, this is the predominant Brazilian
stance regarding negotiations in the MERCOSUR, as shown by its rejection of
supranational institutions in this organization.
and security perspective even if the broadening of ASEAN may become a drag on the deepening of
economic, social, and cultural cooperation." Ibid.
'9 Ibid. p. 135.
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INTRODUCTION
While cooperation in defense procurement and production might seem to
run against the historical tide of secret arms races for superiority, it is
likely that the security threats facing Latin America in the coming decades
will demand not defense against neighboring armies, but cooperatively
combating forces beyond one nation's control.
This chapter will examine MERCOSUR and analyze the integrative political-
economic processes that have spurned this organization and the consequences that these
processes have in the security arena. In this chapter, I will establish the following
arguments, and these will be further developed in the ensuing chapters. First, the new
political-economic context in the Southern Cone has led to fundamental changes in the
security and strategic outlook of these societies. Second, that the eventual success of
MERCOSUR depends in great part on the maintenance of the basic tenets of democracy
in the region. In other words, without democracy in the Southern Cone there is no
MERCOSUR. Political-economic convergence coupled with transnational threats to
security, are forcing nations to cede varying amounts of sovereignty. Given that it will be
argued that it is more beneficial for developing countries to formally consolidate and
strengthen the institutions of existing regional organizations such as MERCOSUR so that
these countries, limited resource-wise, can coordinate their policies to counter common
threats. This argument is also based on the assumption that as a member of a regional
organization, it is strategically more beneficial for a developing country to deal with other
90 Patrice M. Franko, 1996:19.
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blocs collectively rather than on an individual basis. A corollary to this argument is that
the lack of supranationality within MERCOSUR may be an impediment to the sturdiness
of this organization in the long run and in the face of serious crisis situations in the
region.
To properly put forth the above arguments this chapter will consist of four
sections. First, I will provide a brief history of MERCOSUR. In doing so, the
institutional characteristics of this organization will be explained given that many authors
have argued that it is MERCOSUR's institutions (or lack of institutionalization) that limit
the Southern Cone countries from becoming a full-fledged community, and common
market. Hence, in relation to security cooperation between these countries, the formal
juridical mechanisms that have been established within MERCOSUR are deemed
relevant to an understanding of the potential breadth of this organization. Second, the
altered, post-Cold War content of security and strategic issues in the Western Hemisphere
will be analyzed.
The third part of this chapter will explore the security implications of political-
economic integration for the Southern Cone nations. The idea that economic integration
is conducive to security cooperation comes into question as possible setbacks to the
ongoing processes of integration occur. Also, current trends like the militarization of
police functions will be discussed since they may threaten the process of democratization
that these countries are undergoing. Lastly, this chapter will discuss proposals for the
common security of the region.
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MERCOSUR
This renewal of the integration vocation undoubtedly has its roots in
political change underway in the Southern Cone countries. The Latin
American democratization process, spurning the national security
doctrine, a loosening of the foreign debt tension, have all been factors with
a positive influence on the renewal of this interest in integration and the
renewed values attributed to its targets.91
It was the return to democracy in Brazil and Argentina that was the key element
in their diplomatic rapprochement. A key step in deepening relations between these two
countries was the signing of the Program for Integration and Economic Co-operation
(PICE, or PICAB, which is the Spanish-Portuguese acronym) by Presidents Alfonsin of
Argentina and Samey of Brazil in 1986.92 The main goal of the PICAB was to increase
bilateral trade in order to improve both economies, thereby maintaining political stability
in these two new democratic regimes.93 After the signing of the PICAB, a number of
negotiations leading to the signing of the Treaty of Asuncion ensued, the most important
result being the Treaty of Integration and Economic Cooperation that was signed by
Alfonsin and Samey in Buenos Aires on November 1988.94 The goal of this treaty was to
establish a customs union between Argentina and Brazil by the year 1999. Even though
the Sarney-Alfonsin agreements brought neither economic nor political stability to their
countries, they were instrumental in increasing and diversifying bilateral trade.
"Furthermore, the inclusion in the PICAB of programs of cooperation in the nuclear
91 Jorge Lucdngeli, 1998: 22.
92 Peter Coffey, 1998: 4 & 6. This agreement comprised twenty-four individual sectors covering trade
especially in capital goods, wheat and the automobile industry. It also included cooperation in technology
and the supply of energy and other fields of activity
* Thomas Andrew O'Keefe, 1993: 1.
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energy field contributed to greatly reducing tensions that had traditionally marked
Argentine-Brazilian relations." 95
In July 1990 Carlos Menem and Fernando Collor de Mello, the respective
presidents of Argentina and Brazil, signed the Buenos Aires Act, which proposed the
creation of a common market between the two countries, otherwise known as Mercosur.
The Mercosur called for the establishment of a common market by the target date of
1995, as opposed to 1999, as was delineated by the 1988 Alfonsin-Samey agreement.96 It
is worth noting that the former agreement called for a customs union while the latter
sought the more ambitious goal of establishing a common market.
The Asunci6n Treaty was signed by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay on
March 26, 1991. As in the Buenos Aires Act, this treaty called for the establishment of a
common market, but with the inclusion of Paraguay and Uruguay. Paraguayan and
Uruguayan fears that they would be shut out of an integrative process involving their two
largest trading partners led these two countries to seek inclusion into the process.97 For
political and economic reasons it would have been unreasonable for these two countries
not to seek inclusion in an integrative process that could provide increased access to two
very large markets for their goods and improve their international bargaining position in a
globalizing economy. It is also noteworthy, and relevant to this project, that Paraguay
was invited to join the MERCOSUR because of the return to democracy in that country.
9 Maria Eugenia Mujica, 1997: 108. The main objectives of this treaty were the elimination of existing
tariff and non-tariff barriers.
" O'Keefe, 1993: 1.
96 Ibid. 
. 2.
9" Ibid.
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Jorge Lucingeli points out that the central objective set down by the Treaty of Asunci6n
is the integration of member states through the achievement of the following goals:
* The free movement of goods, services and productive factors by, among other
measures, the elimination of customs duties and non-tariff barriers and any other
equivalent measures on the movement of goods.
* The establishment of a Common External Tariff (CET) and the adoption of a
common trade policy for third party countries or group of countries and the
coordination of policy stances adopted in regional and international economic and
trade forums.
* The coordination of macroeconomic and sectoral policies between Member States: in
fields that include foreign trade, agriculture, industry, fiscal and monetary policies,
foreign exchange and capital movements, services, customs, transport and
communications, and others to be agreed on, in order to ensure adequate competitive
conditions between member states.
* The commitment to harmonize legislation of member countries in pertinent areas, to
reinforce completion of the integration process.98
INSTITUTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF MERCOSUR
A free trade area consists of an entity that removes tariff and quota type
restrictions on goods among the member states, and is the most basic form of
integration.99 A customs union is made up of a free trade area with a CET regarding third
countries. A common market combines these factors, plus the free movement of goods,
services, labor, and capital, as well as the coordination of macroeconomic and sectorial
policies and may require the harmonization of members' national legislations. "Total
economic integration is similar to federal, state, or community relationships in that each
of the relevant states retain certain powers while overarching economic and social
98 Lucingeli, 1998: 22-23.
9 Jorge M. Guira, 1997: 16.
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policies, affecting the entity as a whole, reside in a binding, decision-making body with
supranational authority."'00
The Asuncion Treaty was not very specific regarding the institutional framework
for the integration arrangement, or the rights and obligations created for the parties,
which are the necessary provisions that explain how countries can create a common
market.101 This treaty was designed as a transition agreement meant to be supplemented
by later agreements that were to provide both the institutional structure of MERCOSUR
and how the common market was to be established. "The Treaty of Asunci6n, therefore,
established only a skeletal framework for the necessary institutions."10 2
The first decision of the Common Market Council, which is the main political
organ of Mercosur, was to approve the interim dispute settlement system proposed by the
Brasilia Protocol to the Asuncion Treaty. Following the Brasilia Protocol, the next major
agreement was the signing of the Protocol of Ouro Preto in 1994, which created the
political institutions of the MERCOSUR and extended the transition period for the
integration process up until the year 2006. The Asuncion Treaty and the Protocol of
Ouro Preto established the following Mercosur institutions:
1. The Council of the Common Market (CMC), which is the main political organ of
Mercosur, in charge of the political aspects of the integration process. It is a
decision-making body, which seeks to fulfill the objectives established by the
Asunci6n Treaty and the final implementation of the Common Market.
2. The Common Market Group (GMC) is the executive body of MERCOSUR.
100 Ibid. Regarding the definition of a common market see in
h.1e bassy.or /uruuay/econl ercosurmerc-003 tml, p. 3.
101 Cherie O'Neal Taylor, 1997: 53.
102 Ibid. Taylor notes that seven articles of the treaty describe the two political institutions that were
supposed to administer and implement the treaty during the transition period, which was to last until the
end of 1994, the Council of the Common Market and the Common Market Group.
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3. The Trade Commission of MERCOSUR (CCM) is the organization charged with
assisting the GMC. Its main responsibility is to oversee the application of the
instruments of common commercial policy.
4. The Joint Parliamentary Commission (CPC) is the representative body of the
Parliaments of the MERCOSUR countries.
5. The Social and Economic Advisory Forum (FCES) is the representative institution of
economic and social sectors.
6. The Administrative Secretariat of MERCOSUR (SAM) is the operational support
organism that is responsible for providing services to the other MERCOSUR
bodies. 0 3
The Ouro Preto Protocol reincorporates the interim dispute settlement system
instead of establishing a permanent dispute settlement system. 04 This is significant
because any free trade, customs union or common market agreement must have at the
very least political institutions and a dispute settlement mechanism. 0 5 The Ouro Preto
Protocol does establish that the CMC, GMC and the CCM each have the power to make
legislative decisions that are declared by the Protocol to be binding on the member states,
yet, the institutions are not given supranational authority. Several articles of the protocol
point out that the MERCOSUR institutions are to make decisions only by unanimous
consensus. "The states are, therefore, responsible for incorporating the MERCOSUR
decisions into their own legal systems." 106  Regarding the importance of political
institutions and dispute settlement Cherie O'Neal Taylor offers the following analysis:
The political institutions are necessary to allow the countries to reach
decisions about how to implement the treaty obligations and objectives
103 Embassy of Uruguay, 1998: 1. This document also states that the present institutional structure does not
have an undefined duration and that when the member countries consider it timely, they will convene a
diplomatic conference with the purpose of evaluating the institutional structure of MERCOSUR, as well as
the scope of authority of each of the bodies. See also Mujica p.?
104 Taylor, 1997: 53-54. On page 53, Taylor states that according to Article 3 of the Asuncion Treaty, the
parties were charged with adopting a permanent system for the settlement of disputes at some time during
the transition period on the way to a common market.
105 Ibid. p. 50. Taylor poses that the dispute settlement mechanism is needed to resolve disputes that may
arise over the meaning and application of the agreement's legal obligations and objectives.
106 Ibid. p. 56.
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and to oversee that implementation... A dispute settlement mechanism is
crucial to the viability of an economic integration arrangement because the
traditional method by which states resolve disputes is through
negotiations... A well designed dispute system will inevitably be
responsive to, and reflective of, the economic goals being sought (the
depth of economic integration desired by the participating countries), the
political constraints (limitations imposed by the governments or domestic
politics of the participating countries), as well as perceptions about the
proper role of international institutions.1 07
Taylor argues that the absence of any supranational institutional bodies in
MERCOSUR can be traced to political limitations as well as perceptions about past Latin
American integration efforts. The political limitations come from the domestic legal
systems of the member countries and the political realities of MERCOSUR membership.
For example, Argentina and Paraguay have constitutions that accept the possibility of a
supranational legal order; the Brazilian and Uruguayan constitutions, on the other hand,
do not accept supranational bodies.108 It is worth noting, however, that Uruguay is the
biggest proponent of a supranational court within MERCOSUR, and is obviously willing
to amend its constitution to allow this. Brazil could also amend its constitution but is
unwilling to cede any sovereignty to supranational bodies.109 In this regard, Brazilian
Minister-Counselor Leda Lucia Camargo argues that the absence of supranational bodies
results in less costs, less bureaucracy, and therefore greater flexibility and speed in
accommodating problems and differences that may arise between the member states." 0
The participating countries originally expressed a preference for minimal institutionalism
over the establishment of a regional bureaucracy. "The concern is that such a
107 Ibid.
108 Ibid. p. 57. Look also in Gira, pp. 17-8.
09 Look in the Brazilian Federative Constitution, C.F. article 4 of 1988 constitution (1994 revised ed.).
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bureaucracy would not be closely linked to the political process in each country or the
task of actually reducing trade barriers.""' This is the main Brazilian argument
regarding its refusal of establishing supranational bodies in MERCOSUR, and it is
unquestionable that Brazil, the most powerful member of MERCOSUR, would have the
most to lose in moving from political negotiations to supranational institutions as a
mechanism to resolve disputes. Therefore, the Brazilian decision is not necessarily based
on a juridical argument (or the unconstitutionality of accepting supranational bodies), but
on political reasons.
Until recently, Argentina stood against the idea of supranationality, yet this
position has changed. The altered Argentine position states that MERCOSUR needs to be
further institutionalized by establishing a Court that can respond to existing and future
conflicts given that as relations increase and negotiations intensify, the possibilities for
conflict will increase as well. Hence, according to this line of thought, an organism for
the purposes of dispute settlement with supranational authority is deemed necessary.'2
The present model for the resolution of conflicts that MERCOSUR follows is one based
on political negotiations and the consensus rule. 3 MERCOSUR lacks the component of
supranationality that is needed to deepen integration, which means that the Mercosur is
weak institutionally (as opposed to the European Union, for example). One could argue
110 Leda Lucia Camargo, draft of key-note presentation at the Mercosur Conference: Convergence or
Conflict?, November, 1998, p. 5.
"1 Taylor, 1997: 57. See also Fedrerick M. Abbott, 1995, p. 176-177. Abbott states that the political
power to actually make the trade policy changes necessary rests with the Executive branch in each
MERCOSUR country. (citation as cited by Cherie O'Neal Taylor, 1997).
112 Christian Torres, Editorial Continental, 03-03-1998.
113 Camargo, 1998: 9. Camargo explains that all MERCOSUR bodies are governmental, not supranational
institutions, and argues that the consensus rule increases the feeling of security since each country knows
that no decision will be taken without its approval, and that when consensus has been reached all are
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further that the integration process in the Southern Cone is too dependent on the wills of
those persons in power." 4 Yet, the MERCOSUR was designed to reflect its member
states' desire to achieve economic integration through political cooperation rather than
institutionalism.)15 Following this reasoning then, security cooperation (as opposed to
common security, for example) may offer the most realistic parameters for strategic
cooperation in combating common threats to security within MERCOSUR's present
political-economic framework.' 6
THE NEW SECURITY CONTEXT OF THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE
The great paradox is that the welcome disappearance of communism as a
basic threat has created a conceptual crisis in strategic thinking." 7
Security does not exist in relation to a predetermined set of specific conditions but
instead as a term of reference to a sliding scale of greater or lesser threats that inevitably
vary over time and space." 8 The concept of security has traditionally dealt with negative
security issues such as threats to sovereignty, borders and physical survival. Today, the
concept also encompasses positive security such as economic security, housing, health
care, education and environmental integrity. "9 It must be added that the principal 'new'
negative threats to national as well as public security in the Western Hemisphere are drug
committed to the decision. Moreover, she argues that in practice, the consensus rule encourages the four
countries to search for means to overcome stalemates, and thus, requires creative bargaining.
114 Mujica, 1997: 112.
"1 Taylor, 1997: 56.
116 I distinguish between cooperative and common security in pages 38 & 39.
117 Richard Downes, 1996: 2. Quote by Cesar Gaviria, Secretary-General of the Organization of American
States.
118 Jeffrey Stark, North-South Issues, September, 1992: 1. Interestingly, Stark points out that the linguistic
root of the word security, securus, means free from care.
119 Ibid. p. 4.
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trafficking and terrorism. Latin American countries are limited resource-wise to address
positive security concerns and it should be noted that in the present Latin American
context, resources will most likely be spent first on combating security threats such as
drugs, terrorism and rising crime. In sum, Jeffrey Stark provides three general postulates
for the broadening of the definition of security:
1. Since democratic rule and constitutional procedures are the only available
mechanisms by which the nation can express its security requirements, national
security requires their preservation.
2. The provision of basic human needs must be part of any meaningful definition of
national security.
3. More problematic, threats that meet the threshold of causing extra-constitutional,
large-scale disruptions of social peace fall into the sphere of national security.12 0
The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet system coupled with the
regional processes of re-democratization and the liberalization of markets in the Western
Hemisphere have significantly affected the Latin American region. "Re-democratization
has resulted in new types of relations and has shifted the balance between state and
society, between economic forces and political actors, and between the armed forces and
civilian authorities."12 1 Moreover, as democracy matures in Latin America, civilians
have become fully engaged in the dialogue on the region's strategic priorities,
traditionally considered the exclusive domain of the military, and are forcing a
reexamination of the state's priorities, including the role of the military and resources
allocated to support that role.122 Rojas Aravena suggests that if the region is to be
reconstituted, regional cooperation will have to be achieved as a deliberate project.
120 Ibid. p. 6.
121 Rojas Aravena, 1994: 174.
122 Richard Downes, 1996: 1.
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Efforts aimed at achieving common security emphasize international over national means
and peaceful means over threats of force. 2 3
COOPER ATIVE SECURITY
A conceptual distinction between the concepts of cooperative and collective
security is necessary. Collective security implies that the nations, which form part of a
community, must show credibility in defending each other. Cooperative security, on the
other hand, means mutual adjustment for mutual gain. David Mares argues that
cooperative security is more applicable to heterogeneous communities than common
security. 2 4 Given the lack of supranational institutional bodies in MERCOSUR
cooperative security is clearly more applicable than common security since the term
cooperation implies negotiation among distinct parties, for example, between foreign
ministries. In this context, relationships can be mutually beneficial and aid in
accustoming different state actors such as governments and militaries to engage in open
dialogues and to coordinate different activities in their efforts to combat common threats.
It is possible to identify three trends which best describe the axes of security
cooperation in the Western Hemisphere since the onset of the post Cold War era.
Richard Downes offers:
1. Institutional Reinvention, which consists of the reshaping and strengthening of those
institutions most prominent in the old hemispheric order, such as the Organization of
American States (OAS), which has been the most prominent proponent of this theme.
Such efforts seek creation of a regional institutional framework to formalize and
consolidate the peaceful relations among the states of the region.
1 Rojas Aravena, 1994: 176-177.
124 David Mares, 1994: 267.
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2. Thematic Redesign, which is closely related to initiatives of institutional reinvention,
is the broad-based effort to advance two hypothesis considered proven by Western,
especially European, experience:
A) Civilian control of military forces needs to be strengthened.
B) The promotion of confidence - and security - building measures will, of
themselves, create a complex of harmonious relationships that will prevent
misunderstandings and undercut belligerent definitions of the national interest.
3. Subregional Detente, which is the enhanced bilateral and multilateral understanding
that has occurred in association with progress of subregional trade integration. 125
As in the other regions mentioned in the first chapter, a conceptual broadening of
the definition of security is taking place in the Western Hemisphere. It is noteworthy
that, at the present time, a consensus on the concept of security does not exist in the
Americas, and there is also a lack of clarity regarding the type of threats that collectively
affect the countries in the hemisphere.126  I believe that economic interdependence
generates cooperative security. This is put into practice not only out of convenience but
out of necessity between the countries in the region. This is the case because each
country has a much larger stake in the security of its neighbors given that they have
become increasingly interdependent. As will be shown in the next chapter, this may
explain Argentine and Brazilian intervention during Paraguay's institutional crises of
1996 and 1999.
Given the present neo-liberal economic context, the competitiveness of the
neoliberal market creates externalities that can only be resolved by cooperation. 27
Moreover, competition in markets has led to the need for cooperation in security and
125 Downes, 1996: 3-5. My italics.
126 Francisco Carrion Mena, p. 20. He cites Francisco Rojas Aravena. Look in America Latina
Alternativas y Mecanismos de Prevencion en Situaciones Vinculadas a la Soberania Territorial; Revista
Paz y Seguridad en las Americas, No. 14, October, 1997, p. 15, FLACSO-Chile.
127 Patrice Franko, 1996: 19.
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environmental policies in order to address the conflicts created by the drive toward global
production. "In contrast to the use of force by the state to defend mercantile interests in
the pre-capitalist era, globalized market structures will demand new forms of military
cooperation to enhance security."128 As to what the exact shape these new forms of
military cooperation will take remains to be seen. Peacekeeping missions led under the
banner of international organizations are apparently becoming the norm. Regional
peacekeeping missions in Latin America would most likely be enacted under the banner
of the OAS, and one could draw an example of this from the decisive role played by this
organization during the 1996 Oviedo coup attempt in Paraguay. Even if one is to
consider the idea of peacekeeping missions at the regional level as a good one, it becomes
difficult to estimate just how much these will add to a nation's security over time, and at
what level multi-lateral programs will detract from other missions. 129 In this regard, the
role of the United States as the hegemonic power in the hemisphere is tantamount, yet,
there is often a clear divergence regarding the goals of cooperative security in the minds
of policy makers from the United States and of those in Latin America.
Keeping in mind the three trends that were pointed out earlier, it is worth noting
that new forms of hemispheric accommodation require changes in the paradigms used by
decision-makers in both the United States and Latin America.130 As regards to inter-
American relations, the priorities in the US outlook toward Latin American countries that
include the strengthening of democratic institutions, civilian control over the armed
128 Ibid.
129 Ibid. p. 16.
13 Augusto Varas, 1994: 13.
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forces and economic development."' Furthermore, the issues of drug trafficking and
undocumented immigration indicate that Latin American autonomy now constitutes a
central reality for U.S. policy-makers. 32  This means that the outlook in the United
States, as a consequence of the end of the Cold War, is not on extra-hemispheric threats
so much as on Latin America itself. The United States Security Strategy of the Americas
document provides the following summary:
In the past, U.S. engagement in the region was episodic and unilateral with
U.S. military assets applied to deal with traditional threats to security.
After WWII, U.S. policy in the region tended to view local events
geostrategically against the backdrop of the bipolar Cold War conflict.
The direct application of U.S. military power to situations in the
hemisphere often strained relations with other countries in the region.
Today, a concept of "cooperative security" is emerging, with greater
emphasis on integrated approaches to shared problems. The dangers the
U.S. faces today are more diverse. The line between domestic and foreign
policies has blurred. Transnational phenomena like narco-trafficking and
terrorism have long-term consequences for domestic and regional security.
It is understood that not all security risks are military in nature and require
well-coordinated approaches. But military institutions continue to play a
key role in working toward solutions, and strategic planning can never
discount the need for combat-ready forces.133
An enduring heritage of the United States in its foreign policy initiatives toward
Latin America has been efforts by the U.S. to use its ties with Latin American institutions
in order to promote agendas that have been frequently unrelated to, or even at variance
with, national interests in Latin America countries. 134 In this regard, organizations such
as MERCOSUR are playing an increasingly important political role. Indeed, it may be a
lot more difficult for the U.S. to promote agendas that are at variance with the national
13 Ibid. p. 16.
132 Lars Schoultz, 1994: 47.
133 United States Security Strategy for the Americas, p. 2.
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interests in a MERCOSUR country, especially if these have a negative impact on its
partners. Keeping in mind the central question of this thesis, it would appear that some
relationship exists between economic integration and security cooperation in
MERCOSUR due to the fact that this organization becomes relevant in the regional
strategic security discourse, as I have just suggested.
SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF INTEGRATION IN THE SOUTHERN CONE
Security cooperation as a subtext of subregional trade integration may fall victim
to the surfeit of declarations and pronouncements that seems to accompany the
process. With no administrative infrastructure to encourage and track progress
toward stated security objectives, this process raises the specter of a hopelessly
complex matrix representing little more than good intentions.135
In Latin America, the focus on economic security is an old theme that is taken up
with new urgency by vulnerable democracies. 136 While economic growth is not a new
phenomenon in Latin America, broadly shared economic growth would be. "Thus, the
link between aggregate levels of economic growth and security is tenuous and uncertain,
with the former necessary but not sufficient for the latter."137 This brings us to the
question of what implications neo-liberalism has for security policy in the region. A key
assumption of neo-liberal theory is that the private market performs better than the state
in the allocation of resources. "Its implementation is first and foremost about limiting the
economic choices a state makes in the development process." 3 8 Yet, defense is not
134 Millet, 1997: 121.
135 Downes, 1996: 7.
136 Stark, 1992: .
1 Ibid.
1 Franko, 1996: 14.
41
market driven since security decision-making is the government's responsibility. In the
neo-liberal context, governments are increasingly constrained in their abilities to pursue a
wide range of options. With fewer available resources, the opportunity costs of making
one choice versus the other increase. 139 With respect to integration then, the increasing
similarity among Latin American policies suggests that economic convergence is possible
even amidst considerable national diversity, while on the other hand, divergent
viewpoints in the field of strategic-military relations generates pressures toward national
self-assertion. 4 0 In this regard, Stark provides the following summary:
Perhaps the central paradox in the formulation of the concept of national
security is that it must account for the gradual erosion of sovereignty
characteristic of the post Cold-War era of interdependence. No one nation
can surmount effectively problems of the environment, migratory flows,
drug trafficking, or the spread of disease. The maintenance of a sovereign
and stable national requires the prudent ceding of sovereignty to
supranational bodies. 4 1
At this juncture, the role played by MERCOSUR becomes instrumental. Luigi
Manzetti suggests that at the political level, MERCOSUR has provided its partners with a
forum for the discussion of common policies regarding nuclear proliferation,
environmental protection, drug trafficking, and illegal immigration.142  This is a
questionable assertion, particularly in that there is no convergence within MERCOSUR
regarding labor flows that constitute immigration, environmental protection, and drug
trafficking, which is an issue that has spurned varied proposals by the member states
(which will be pointed out later in this chapter) but has wielded no concrete policies thus
"9 Ibid.
140 Varas, 1994: 11.
141 Stark, p. 4. Stark defines national security as the security of the population or civil society that
composes the nation.
42
far. Regarding nuclear proliferation, one could argue that the forum for talks in this
subject were provided by the Alfonsin-Sarney agreements, yet, these occurred before the
inception of MERCOSUR. Manzetti is correct in asserting that MERCOSUR has played
a positive role in South America by fostering political and economic cooperation among
countries traditionally divided by nationalistic rivalries.143 Hence, it could be argued that
the trend toward economic integration can affect threat perception in the region in a
positive way. "If the MERCOSUR, and multilateral initiatives deliver promises of
increased interaction, the result may be a new hierarchy of values within the individual
countries." 144 Economic integration could reshape perceptions of national interests, and
alter evaluations of the costs and benefits of international strategic interactions.145 To
reiterate, in the present neo-liberal economic context there are fewer resources available
for governments, and thus the opportunity costs of making one decision over the other
increases. 146 In the case of the southern cone, governments are faced with the dilemma of
how to spend limited resources to combat problems that are often transnational in nature,
and, in the case of drug trafficking, seemingly overwhelming.
The agenda supplanting the problems of balances of power and state security,
now concerns the management of human existence and include the environment, trade,
drugs, hunger, technology, industrial restructuring, and migration, among others.
"Within each of these issue areas the boundary between domestic and international
142 Manzetti, 1992: 5.
143 Ibid.
14 Guedes de Costa, 1994: 140.
145 Ibid.
146 Franko, 1996: 19.
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aspects has become increasingly blurred, tenuous and complex."1 47 As discussed in the
previous chapter, security is undergoing a conceptual redefinition as a result of the end of
the Cold War. This is a common theme that runs through the different regions that have
been discussed, Latin America being no exception. Because the driving force of these
new international relations is the competitiveness of economic relations, the parameters
for power politics and cooperation for peace remain undefined. Given the difficulties of
advancing toward a new global security regime, it may be more feasible to increase
international security through the negotiation of bilateral accords and sub-regional
agreements in specific thematic and functional areas. 4 8
It is in this sense that the idea that MERCOSUR could act as a nexus between
divergent viewpoints of international political and military actors, as they attempt to first
attend to their own national interests, becomes worth investigating. A key question
pertains to how this could be operationalized, keeping in mind MERCOSUR's
institutional limitations and the fact that it is an economic organization Before tackling
this question it is necessary to discuss what the present nature of civil-military relations is
and what effects these have on the practices of democracy.
IN SEARCH OF A NEW ROLE FOR THE MILITARY
In the present circumstances, it is not all clear how we might interpret
what seem to be simultaneous trends in Latin America toward more
democratic regimes and a decline in state capacities to maintain public
security without resorting to high levels of coercion.149
147 Rojas Aravena, 1994: 174.
148 Ibid. p. 172.
149 Garnarra and Kincaid, 1995: 1.
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Gamarra and Kincaid argue that a new model of public security is emerging in
Latin America in response to world systemic, international, and domestic pressures. This
model has significant and unfavorable implications for the institutions and practices of
democracy.150 They point to a regional pattern of state formation, as well as government
responses to what are perceived as crises of public security. "One of the principal
defining characteristics of this pattern is a recourse to military intervention in support of,
or in place of, normal police responsibilities.""'
Despite the fact that the military interventions they cite took place within legal,
constitutional frameworks, and in response to the initiatives of elected civilian leaders,
there is a serious threat to democratic institutions posed by these policies.1 12 "Both the
recourse to states of exception and deployment of troops to police the streets and chase
criminals pose a deterioration of citizen security, the enjoyment of basic political and
civil rights. "153 In the Brazilian instance, of concern are two operations known as
Operation Rio I and II, which occurred in November 1994 under Itamar Franco's
government, and in April 1995, with Fernando Cardoso as head of state. There were two
main causes that lead to the military being called into the Brazilian favelas
(shantytowns):
First, the domination of several favelas by organized criminal gangs, who
were mainly involved in drug trafficking activities and commanding
illegal lotteries. "The gangs increasingly were functioning as a parallel
state, with local bosses (estimated to number some 300) controlling access
to neighborhoods, regulating commerce, imposing curfews, and granting
"0 Ibid. p. 2. In their study, Gamarra and Kincaid focus on recent occurrences of the militarization of
police functions in Bolivia, Brazil and Honduras. For the purposes of this work, the Brazilian case is of
particular interest.
"' Ibid. p. 1.
112 Ibid. p. 12
153 Ibid.
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permission for candidates to campaign for public offices. This system
rested on a combination of corruption and coercion - local police and
public officials were paid off for their tolerance or active involvement,
while rivalries, resistance, and disobedience were settled summarily and
violently. The other crucial element was a discredited police, which had
come to mirror the gangs in their tendencies toward corruption and violent
action. 154
In Brazil, the military and civilian police are the two police systems that operate
locally and that are organized at the state level. During the authoritarian regimes that
lasted from 1964-1984 in Brazil, the military police forces were under centralized army
control and had counter-insurgency and repressive responsibilities. Following the
adoption of a new constitution in 1988, the military police, while remaining a part of the
armed forces, were placed under the authority of civilian state governors. "The civil and
military police still constitute parallel organizations with overlapping functions of
maintaining order, conducting investigations, serving arrest warrants, and so on."155
To synthesize, direct operations occurred beginning on November 19, 1994 and
later on April 4, 1995. There were numerous human rights abuses during these
operations and, while having immediate deterrent effect, soon afterwards crime
increased.156  This emerging model of public security in Latin America has three
noteworthy features:
1. a militarization of public security for large sectors of the population, wherein large
scale disorder is repressed but crime may well flourish, and citizen security will be
minimal;
114 Ibid. p. 4.
ass Ibid. pp. 4-5.
156 Ibid. pp. 5-6. The authors point out that the typical operation involved the deployment of some 1,500-
2,000 troops to cordon off a particular neighborhood, attempt to serve standing arrest warrants, search for
drugs and detain anyone not carrying identification. They add that controversy arose almost immediately
over soldiers' abusive treatment of those they detained, and over the fact of detention itself, since carrying
identification is not required under Brazilian law.
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2. a simultaneous informalization of some public security functions, whether provided
in the form of paramilitary neighborhood groups, ... or the "parallel state" of
shantytown criminal organizations, ... ; and
3. a privatization of public security for those who can afford to pay for it, as a
commodity to be purchased. 157
There are two causal explanations for the emergence of this model. One is
Guillermo O'Donnell's "crisis of the state", which is the contemporary interaction of
neo-liberal economic policies and the specific historical formations of state and political
systems. From this perspective, the shrinking of the state undermines state capacities for
extending the effectiveness of the rule of law across both territory and social order in an
equitable manner.158 The second explanatory factor is the transnational economy of
illegal drugs, which is seen as a perverse form of integration into the world economy for
national and local economies and social actors. "In sum, the dynamics of illegal drug
trafficking interact with those of the weakened Latin American state to fuel the
contemporary crisis of public security."159
157 Ibid. p. 13. In relation to the third feature of this proposed model, the La Nacion article Lafuncion
policial no es delegable, dated August 2, 1999, argues against the recent Buenos Aires law (Provincial Law
# 12.297) that gives private security officers policing powers. This law states that officers employed with
private security agencies in the Buenos Aires territory may guard not only their specific work place, but its
immediate surroundings as well. Moreover, in those immediate surroundings, an officer may react not only
to delinquent actions but those to those persons that he may perceive as acting suspicious with the same
coercive authority that a police officer is entitled to utilizing. They are entitled to use weapons for
intimidation purposes as well as for legitimate self-defense. The goal of provincial political authorities is to
integrate, through cooperation, private and public security forces to prevent crime. The author wonders
whether all possible measures have been taken to improve the public police forces so that they may better
execute their mission, and whether private security officers are properly prepared to partake some of the
roles that society has assigned to police officers. The author concludes that public security should not be
delegated and is the sole function of the state, and argues that assigning civilians police authority is
unacceptable. The author suggests that such an occurrence smacks of vigilantism.
"' Ibid.
a Ibid.
47
Policies oriented to demilitarizing efforts to cope with the transnational drug
economy should be considered so as to reduce the levels of violence associated with it.160
This may not be a very viable alternative, however, given the pressure that the U.S. puts
on Latin American countries to enlist their militaries in the war against drugs. This
strategy is regarded as a recipe for disaster by every government in the region. 161 In a
similar vein, Richard Millet argues that military involvement in operations against
narcotics traffickers and other organized criminal activity has become cause for mounting
concern. "Questions have also arisen over what role, if any, the military should play in
defending the environment, in dealing with migration, and in developing the
economy."1 62
As pertaining to Argentina, the La of Interior Defense outlines that the
maintenance of interior security implicates the human and material employment of all
police and national security forces.163 National security forces, of course, include those
that are military in nature. In the same document it is further specified under which
circumstances security forces, outside of the norms that rule the federal jurisdiction, may
be strictly used to fulfill the following maneuvers:
1. When the collective life, liberty and patrimony of the habitants of a determined region
are endangered.
2. When the constitutional rights and guarantees of the institutions of the representative
system, republican and federal, are seriously threatened.
3. In situations of disaster according to the terms that dictate civil defense. 64
160 Ibid. p. 14.
161 New York Times, 6-2-99. Latin America's Armies Are Down, But Not Out.
162 Millet, 1997: 122
163 Ley De Seguridad Interior, Law 24.059, Title I, Article 3 (1988).
164 Ibid. Title IV, Article 23.
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Apparently, under certain social circumstances, the Argentine military is, within
the bounds of legality, allowed to intervene and partake police functions. Furthermore,
and in the context of the still undefined role(s) that the militaries of the Southern Cone
region should play, the debate regarding some type of MERCOSUR defense doctrine is
relevant. The polemical project for the creation of a common security system for
MERCOSUR was inspired by an increase in the number of social conflicts, as well as
increasing levels of transit and the consumption of drugs in Argentina and Brazil.165 The
Argentine Ministry of Defense stated that such a "Sistema de Seguridad Comun"
(Common Security System) of the respective armed forces would include a mechanism to
prevent social, cultural, and/or political processes of destabilization in the member states.
"The idea is that if there is an agreement between Argentina and Brazil, then a consensus
could be attempted with Paraguay and Uruguay so that MERCOSUR may incorporate a
military agreement to its commercial and economic pacts." 166 The document, published
by the Ministry of Defense, faced overwhelming opposition and was rejected by
Congress. Yet, such an attempt may be seen as a step from cooperative security to the
common security of Argentina and Brazil. Interestingly, this particular proposal was
made by the Ministry of Defense, and not by the Ministry of Exterior Affairs. Simply
put, the military, in seeking to extend its role, is apparently attempting to increase its
political power and autonomy. It is telling that the main opposition parties, Frente
Solidirio del Pais (FREPASO) and the Radical Party (UCR) were unanimous in their
stance against the project that Defense Minister Jorge Dominguez proposed. The Radical
senator Juan Pablo Baylac stated that at the internal level it is a judicial aberration, and
165 Clarin, 7-28-97. Conflictos Comunes A Ambos Paises.
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that at the external level it would implicate the renunciation of a posture of autonomous
national defense and sovereignty. 167
The idea of establishing a bi-national army such as has been experimented with
the militaries of France and Germany is one thing, but to delegate police authority to the
armed forces, especially ones composed of the members of two different countries is an
entirely different dimension.168 One could only imagine the negative repercussions from
Argentine military officers dealing with crime in the Brazilian favelas, for example. The
idea that has been proposed by the U.S. Southern Command of utilizing the military to
battle diverse problems such as drugs, economic marginality, so on, is not very popular
among most Latin American countries. 169
Argentine Counselor Marcelo Cima argues in his thesis that even though the
definition of security has been widened, this does not mean that the military should play a
major role in battling non-traditional security concerns. 170 This argument stems from the
fact that high-ranking Argentine military officers have on several occasions visited the
U.S. Southern Command without the consent and/or knowledge of the Argentine
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He contends first that Argentina must determine what its
institutional position is in the face of an altered bilateral relationship with the United
States. The second contention is that the greatest contribution that the United States can
make should be in helping Latin Americans recognize the necessity of engaging informed
166 Ibid.
167 Ibid. 7-2997.
168 Clarin. Oscar Cardoso, El Projecto De Seguridad, 7-29-97
169 Ibid.
170 Cima, 1998.
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civilians in all aspects of security policies."7 "Promoting dialogue between civilians and
the military on every level, both national and international, can represent, in and of itself,
not only a significant break from past traditions but also an important step toward
consolidating effective civilian control."1 72 Cima's main argument is that the present
direct relation between the Ministry of Defense or the Commanders of the Argentine
Armed Forces with U.S. Southern Command to resolve issues that are pertinent to
Argentine interests is unacceptable since these contain a political content that goes
beyond what is strictly military. 173 Tied into this is a current debate in Argentina in
which on the one hand, there is a consensus in hemispheric meetings that there are new
security threats and thus new military roles, while on the other, there are in existence
national legislations that are much more restrictive in this respect. 174 Hence, Millet may
be correct in stating that in Latin America, the armed forces will do whatever they can to
maintain their autonomy, privileges, and power.17 5 Civilian-military issues attain further
relevance in the context of MERCOSUR when we look at the Paraguayan case and the
social and political events that have taken place there since 1996, beginning with the
Oviedo coup attempt and its aftermath, which led to a very serious institutional crisis that
culminated with worrying results in the first half of 1999. It is to these events that the
next chapter will turn, and what mediating role the MERCOSUR countries played to
stabilize the political situation in Paraguay in order to maintain democracy.
171 Ibid. pp. 7-76. Look also in Millet, 1997: 129.
172 Millet, 1997: 129. See also in Cima, 1998: 76.
173 Cima, p. 79.
14 Ibid. p. 82,
175 Millet, 1995: 297.
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CHAPTER 3
The strong national and international defense of Paraguayan democracy
against the threat of General Oviedo's attempted military coup in April
1996, while highlighting the delicate nature of the transition, also reflected
the strength of support for democracy in Paraguay.176
Consistent with the central question of this work, which asks if economic
integration is conducive to security cooperation, as a case study I look at the Paraguayan
experience both as a country undergoing a transition to democracy, and as member of
MERCOSUR. Paraguay's membership to this economic organization is conditional on
its maintenance of democracy. The so-called democratic clause of the MERCOSUR has
effectively served as a link between the economic nature of this organization and the
active intervention of Paraguay's partners in its internal security. In light of the trends
that have already been discussed in this work, I believe that this case study will provide
the necessary evidence with respect to the validity of the proposed hypothesis.
The first section of this chapter will examine the transition from the Stroessner
dictatorship to democracy. In doing so, it will be shown that certain characteristics of the
Stroessner era remain intact, bringing into question the genuineness of this democratic
transition. This is important to this work because these persistent traits have hindered the
Paraguayan democratic process. As a result, institutional crises brought on by this
fledging democracy has brought in several international actors such as the OAS, the US
and MERCOSUR into the scene.
176 Peter Lambert, 1997b: 210-11.
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With respect the Stroessner legacy, political and economic power held by
traditional civilian and military elites remains entrenched and are fueled in great part by
corrupt activities. The armed forces still maintain considerable influence not only within
the military sphere, but in non-military issues as well. This may not bode well for efforts
to further the democratization process in this country. Moreover, the arrival of a new
military strongman in General Lino Oviedo signals all too well that the structure of
Paraguayan politics defacto has not been completely altered.177
The second part of this chapter will analyze the events that led to Oviedo's
attempted coup and the international opposition to it. Particularly, the role of the US, the
OAS and MERCOSUR will be analyzed. The final section will discuss the Cubas
presidency and the ensuing discord with Congress and the Judiciary over Oviedo's ten-
year sentence for attempting the coup. Cubas pardoned Oviedo of that sentence and
Congress began the process to impeach him as a result. The March 1999 murder of Luis
Maria Argana and Oviedo's possible involvement culminated in Cubas's resignation and
his departure to Brasilia where he was granted political asylum. Oviedo, in turn, was
granted political asylum in Argentina. The active involvement of Paraguay's
MERCOSUR partners in this country's domestic political affairs points not only to their
key mediating role but has become a serious point of contention, particularly in
Argentine-Paraguayan and Paraguayan- Uruguayan relations. These points of contention
will be discussed in the third section of this chapter.
177 Carlos Martni and Carlos Maria Lezcano, 1997: 65.
53
THE PARAGUAYAN TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY
THE STROESSNER LEGACY
Paraguay's historical prelude to Stronism is the Chaco War against Bolivia, which
took place between 1932 and 1935. The war is significant because it expanded the role
and prestige of the military and resulted in the politicization of the middle class.1 8 A
serious political crisis ensued and resulted in Paraguay's first military dictator, General
Higino Morinigo. He took power in 1940, but was overthrown as a result of the
Paraguayan Civil War of 1947. Colorado Party loyalists won the Civil War, but could
not control their internal divisions. The Colorados eventually allied with the military,
and General Alfredo Stroessner subsequently took power in a 1954 coup.'7 9
Interestingly, Stronism became exclusionary on the basis of party affiliation, and
was not a class-based exclusionary regime like the bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes of
other Southern Cone countries in the 1970s, for instance. "The unusual characteristic of
the Stroessner dictatorship was that it was neither personalistic, military, nor one-party
rule, but rather, a combination of the three. The military never ruled but it guaranteed the
coercive power of the regime and was wholly partisanized."18
Nancy Powers, 1992: 3. In her working paper based on a 1992 conference involving the Paraguayan
transition to democracy she cites the presentations of several authors. She points out Diego Abente's
argument that the aftermath of the Chaco War resulted in the dominance of the fascist-influenced Colorado
Party, a divided Liberal Party, and increased public disenchantment with a government that could win a
war but could not bring about economic development. Ibid.
179 Ibid.
"8 Ibid. Powers adds that the Colorado Party was used to mobilize support down to the precinct level, She
further points out that this triad of party-army-state was so conjoined that one of the keys to a successful
transition is the emergence of Colorado Party and military leaders who will perceive and accept their
institutions as distinct from the state,
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Stroessner built a type of patrimonialism, which in Weberian terminology is
known as sultanism. To Weber:
Patrimonialism and, in the extreme case, sultanism tend to arise whenever
traditional domination develops an administration and a military force
which are purely personal instruments of the master [ruler]... Where
domination... operates primarily on the basis of discretion, it will be called
sultanism... 1
The power of the Stronato was based upon the consolidation of the tripartite structure
made up of the armed forces, the government and the Colorado Party. He was the head
of each institution of this "sultanistic" institutional structure. 82 All three components
played different roles in repression, political control and in weakening civil society.183
Corruption and contraband represented key economic bases during the Stronato. "High-
ranking military officers, politicians and party members enjoyed access to lucrative
commercial ventures, ranging from state monopolies, public contracts to contraband and
drugs, prostitution and the black market." 84
181 Quoted in Linz and Stepan, 1996: 51. Powers further points out that "sultanistic" regimes involve
attention to legal forms (Stroessner held and fraudulently won eight presidential elections), combined with
corruption, arbitrary decisions, repressive violence, imposition of personal rule, and the accumulation of
wealth of ruler and cronies. Powers, 1992: 3-4. Andrew Nickson adds that Stroessner's blend of sultanism
consisted of a highly centralized form of rule, in which reciprocal ties of material support and obligation,
rather than tradition or charisma (as under patrionalism) provided the basis for personal loyalty to the ruler.
Nickson, 1997a: 24.
182 Stroessner was president, commander-in-chief and senior officer of the military, as well as the honorary
president of the Colorado Party. My quotation.
183 Lambert, 1997a: 3-4.
184 Ibid. p. 11. With regards the military, the ideological underpinning of this institution was the National
Security Doctrine (NSD), a Cold War import from the US. Lambert points out that "according to the NSD,
the enemy was not external but rather internal, within opposition organisations. Supposedly influenced and
organized by international communism, these groups manifested themselves in any anti-government
movement or organisation. Although internal security against subversion became the priority of the
military, the absence of any serious communist or even left-wing challenge to the regime after the 1960s
indicates that the NSD was adopted for other motives: it justified large-scale investment in the security
forces, it facilitated economic support from the US and above all it justified repression against real or
perceived opposition. Moreover, it gave legitimacy to the authoritarian nature of the regime." Ibid, p.8.
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Regarding the military, corruption was key for Stroessner to ensure support for
the regime from that institution. 8 5  This was facilitated by Stroessner's decree that
allowed officials who were on active duty to participate in private business activities. 186
He effectively permitted the military to take almost full control over the infrastructure
and logistics of Paraguay's massive black market smuggling networks. 87 Stroessner
used the benefits of corruption to defuse potential intra-elite conflict, while contraband
served not only the interests of elites but imbued society as a whole by guaranteeing
prices lower than those on international markets.188 This created an illusion of material
development, especially among the middle and mid-lower classes. Moreover, the
informal sector, which was based on contraband and corruption, created a convergence of
interests between elites and masses in the maintenance of the status quo. 8 9
The fagade of limited multi-party democracy and legality were key regarding
foreign support for the regime. This enabled Stroessner to escape the international
scrutiny that presented the other Southern Cone dictatorships. In the Cold War context,
Stroessner attained US support through his anti-communism and "his advocacy of
'Paraguayan Stronista democracy'."' 90  Also, during the Stroessner dictatorship,
1'5 Andrew Nickson, 1997a: 25. Nickson cites a 1965 interview where Stroessner alluded to "military
control of the contraband trade as 'the price of peace' (el precio de paz), suggesting that military discontent
was lessened by the prospect of rich pickings to be gained through officially sanctioned illicit activities."
Ibid.
186 Ibid. Nickson adds that the fact that many officers dedicated themselves almost full-time to private
business and utilized equipment belonging to the armed forces for personal purposes contributed to a lack
of professionalism in the armed forces. Ibid. pp 25-6.
187 Barreto, 1996: 14. [Look up this source] Andrew Nickson states that among the range of illicit
activities that the military hierarchy was involved in, the three most important were contraband, narcotics
trafficking and arms trafficking. Nickson, 1997a: 26.
18 8 Lambert, 1997a: 11.
189 Ibid. Lambert adds that this consensus among the majority of the population became a central
component of Stroessner's control over civil society and the longevity of the Stronato.
190 Ibid. p. 13. Lambert points out that although democracy and anti-communism were not deep-rooted
beliefs of Str oessner, they made sound economic sense during the Cold War.
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Paraguay tried to overcome its traditional economic and political dependence on
Argentina by strengthening relations with Brazil. This culminated in the signing of the
Itaipu Treaty on 26 April 1973, which initiated the construction of the gigantic Itaipu
hydroelectric project. This plant is the world's largest and was built in a joint venture
with Brazil, who provided the technology and guaranteed Paraguay's construction debt.
Construction took place between 1974 and 1981, and the massive capital inflows from
this project provided impressive gains in levels of employment, income, and spending.
"This seven-year boom is responsible for Stroessner's reputation of bringing growth and
prosperity to the country, and it enabled him, for a time, to legitimate his regime."1 91
The 1980s, however, saw the end of international support for the Stronato,
particularly from the United States. Stroessner's refusal to liberalize despite US pressure,
and the alleged involvement of senior officials in the international drug trade, resulted in
the straining of relations with its previous ally. Lambert offers:
By the late 1980s, growing political instability and the intransigence of
Stroessner led the US to favor more drastic measures to restore stability
and create a democratic opening in the country. The stronato also found
itself increasingly bereft of ideological allies in the region. Isolation was
heightened by the increasing economic integration of the Southern Cone
countries of Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay. Exclusion from the benefits
of regional economic integration, combined with the restrictive economic
policies of the Stroessner government, gave an impetus to powerful
economic sectors favoring democratization.192
Despite the fact that Paraguay was finding itself increasingly isolated by its
regional neighbors and the US, it was a crisis within the regime that triggered military
191 Powers, 1992: 5.
192 Lambert, 1997a: 17.
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rebellion and ultimately resulted in the fall of Stroessner. " By the mid- 1980s, The
Colorado Party had been divided into two camps: the militantes and the tradicionalistas.
The militante faction led Stroessner to believe that they would be able to maintain his
political model through a succession process involving his son, Air Force colonel
Gustavo Stroessner. 9 4 "To achieve this they had to subordinate the Colorado Party and
the armed forces to their plan of continuing Strossismo after Stroessner 195
"In 1987, internal factionalism openly broke out for the time since 1959. At issue
was control of the pebendary system as well as the succession to Stroessner."
Following the internal party elections of May 1987, the militantes gained control of the
Colorado Party, and through that the public sector. The militantes failed, however, in the
next step towards achieving their objective in Stroessner's succession. They believed
that Rodriguez lacked the sufficient backing to rise up against Stroessner, and thus
attempted to remove Rodriguez from his position as commander of the First Army Corps.
This turned out to be a serious miscalculation as commanders loyal to Rodriguez began to
organize themselves against militante power. 197 All of this culminated in a Rodriguez-led
193 Ibid.
194 Martini and Lezcano, 1997: 65-66.
195 Ibid. p. 66. They point out that there were two obstacles to achieving this: First, the tradicionalista
faction of the Colorado Party "were business partners and in some cases even relatives of high-ranking
military leaders. Second, the need to create a new chain of military loyalties subordinate to Stroessner in
preparation for the succession required the exclusion of the commander of the powerful First Army corps,
General Andres Rodriguez, as well as a large sector of his team of high-ranking officers." Ibid.
Interestingly, Rodriguez had been Stroessner's hand picked successor before this turn of events.
196 Marcial A. Riquelme and Jorge G. Riquelme, 1997: 50. They state that in 1959, the Colorado Party split
up when Stroessner expelled a faction of the party leadership that was interested in democratizing the
country. "This group later formed the Movimiento Popular Colorado (MOPOCO) in exile." Ibid. p. 64.
197 Martini and Lezcano, 1997: 66.
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1989 putsch that overthrew Stroessner.19 Interestingly, it was a little known lieutenant-
colonel who arrested Stroessner: Lino Oviedo.
THE RODRIGUEZ REGIME AND THE RISE OF LINO VIED0
A democratic transition is complete when sufficient agreement has been
reached about political procedures to produce an elected government,
when a government comes to power that is the direct result of a free and
popular vote, when this government de facto has the authority to generate
new policies, and when the executive, legislative and judicial power
generated by the new democracy does not have to share power with other
bodies de jure.199
The new Paraguayan president, General Andres Rodriguez, had been a Stroessner
supporter who had amassed a great fortune from corruption during the Stroessner regime.
He "had come to occupy a pivotal role in the armed forces' involvement in contraband,
narcotics trafficking and money laundering."200 In light of this, Rodriguez attempted to
counter his negative image in the international media and cripple political opposition to
the coup from within the Colorado Party by arresting the leadership of the militante
faction. They were subsequently charged on counts of corruption and human rights
198 Riquelme and Riquelme, 1997: 50. They point out that the tradicionalistas supported the military coup
and became the civilian power base of the Rodriguez government. "In the aftermath of the coup, the most
prominent militantes were removed from power and a few were jailed for corruption. However, the vast
majority of the militantes re-entered the political fold in the 1992 internal Colorado Party elections.
199 Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, 1996: 3. Their italics.
200 Nickson, 1997a: 31. Nickson shows that despite the fact that Paraguay had been utilized as an entrepot
in the international narcotics regime since the early days of the Stroessner regime, it was the Ricord Affair
in 1971-2 that initially drew international attention to the extent of heroin smuggling from Europe to the US
through Paraguay (cites Adams, 1973: 201-40; Clark and Horrock, 1975: 3-22). Nickson, 1997a: 26-7.
Gen. Rodriguez was among those high-ranking military officials who were accused by the US government
of involvement in the traffic. Gen. Rodriguez, at the time second in command of the armed forces, was put
in the US Drug Enforcement Agency's blacklist and was prohibited to enter the US until 1988. In that
year, a rapprochement took place between the US government and Rodriguez as a response to the rise of
the extremist milit te faction of the Colorado Party. "The US government quietly dropped its accusations
of narcotics trafficking against Rodriguez and instead directed them against Stroessner." Ibid. p. 27.
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violations.201 Stroessner and his son Gustavo, on the other hand, were allowed to leave
for exile to Brazil.2 02
On February 3, 1989 (the morning after the coup), Rodriguez established the five
objectives of the putsch:
1. The reunification of the Colorado Party in government.
2. The restoration of the dignity of the armed forces.
3. The beginning of a process of democratization
4. Respect for human rights
5. Defense of the Catholic faith.203
The aim of the first two objectives was the restoration of the Colorado Party-Armed
Forces alliance in government. The last three objectives were in response to the social
and political opposition, as well as to the international community.2 04 Regarding the
effects of the putsch, Martini and Lezcano argue that:
The 1989 putsch did not break the link between the armed forces and the
Colorado Party. But it did alter the political context within which this link
operated. The keys of the Rodriguez government were, domestically, to
consolidate the power of the civilian-military elite and, internationally, to
strengthen its own legitimacy, given its origins as a military putsch.2 0
In an apparent effort to strengthen his legitimacy, Rodriguez called for democratic
elections to be held on May 1989. He stated that he would run in these elections in order
to finish Stroessner's final elected term (which ran through 1993), and promised that he
would not run again in 1993. Rodriguez proclaimed that the "main purpose of the
election was to elect a representative Congress to draft a new electoral law, then call a
constitutional convention, thereby instituting a structure allowing fully free and fair
201 Ibid.
202 Ibid. p. 32.
203 Martini and Lezcano, 1997: 67.
204 Ibid.
201 Ibid. p. 69.
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elections in 1993."2 Rodriguez then reduced the military's internal security role, ended
a ban on opposition political parties, ended newspaper censorship, freed political
prisoners, and reached an agreement with the Catholic Church.207 These initial
democratic openings and his party's vast electoral support, coupled with Rodriguez's
popularity for leading Stroessner's overthrow, catapulted him into the presidency on May
1989 with 74.2% of the popular vote. 208
Foreign policy was an area that had been relegated a secondary role during the
final Stroessner years, but attained a newfound significance in Paraguayan politics after
1989, beginning with the Rodriguez administration. Fernando Masi points to three
reasons of why this is the case:
1. The Rodriguez government sought international support as a form of political
legitimacy.
2. In response to the end of the Cold War, the US abandoned its traditional policy of
support for authoritarian regimes in the region and developed a policy of support for
democratic regimes.
3. The global move towards regional economic integration in the European Community
and the countries of the Pacific Basin gave a new urgency to the question of foreign
policy.209
Foreign relations came to play an important role in the Paraguayan transition to
democracy. As an example, Fernando Masi argues that the decision to join MERCOSUR
was basically a political one, and was not preceded by any serious study of the economic
advantages or disadvantages for Paraguay. Instead, it helped launch Rodriguez's policy
206 Collier, 1998: 8.
207 Freedom House, 1989: 36-38.
208 Riquelme and Riquelme, 1997: 53. They state that "Gen. Rodriguez called elections for 1 May 1989 on
the grounds that this complied with the constitutional requirement that elections should be held within three
months of the dissolution of a government. His reasoning was criticised as spurious because the
constitution had already been violated by the military coup. The real reason behind the hasty call for
elections appeared to be the need to gain international legitimacy for his defacto government." Ibid. pp.
52-3. Their italics.
2 09 Masi, 1997: 181.
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of presidentialist diplomacy and to promote a new international image for the country. 2 10
Strategic factors also played an important part in the decision to join MERCOSUR since
a refusal to participate would have meant that the land-locked country would be left with
little room to maneuver stuck between two economic blocs: the Andean Community and
MERCOSUR. "The Rodriguez government gradually adopted a more favorable policy
towards regional integration as it realized that MERCOSUR opened up new opportunities
for economic development that could redress Paraguay's lack of international
competitiveness."211
On the home front, divisions within the Colorado Party continued to be a
problem. During the 1991 municipal elections, the Colorado Party lost more than 40
municipalities out of a nationwide total of 200 due to the fact that it ran as a divided
party, often standing a number of candidates against each other.212 These election results
sent a clear message to the military hierarchy: "a divided Colorado Party ran the risk of
being defeated in the 1993 presidential elections."213 If this were to occur, the military's
involvement in illegal business practices could be exposed to unwelcome public scrutiny.
As a result, efforts to professionalize the military were reduced as Rodriguez, in a July
1991 statement, called for a return to the granite-like unity (unidad granitica, which was a
common expression during the Stroessner era) of the Colorado Party. 214 Among those
with Rodriguez when he made this statement was a then little known General, Lino
Oviedo. With respect to Oviedo's rise, Martini and Lezcano offer:
210 Ibid. pp. 178-9.
211 Ibid. p. 179.
212 Martini and Lezcano, 1997: 69.
213 Ibid. pp. 69-70.
214 Ibid. p. 70. At the time the Colorado Party was divided into six different factions. Ibid.
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The July 1991 statement also heralded the formal entry into political arena
of General Lino Oviedo. From a position of obscurity under Stroessner,
the rise of Oviedo had been meteoric. Within a year of the putsch, in
which he had played an active role, Oviedo was named commander of the
First Calvary Division, occupying the thirtieth place in the rankings of
brigade generals. He then proceeded to clear the path to his own
advancement within the armed forces. 15
General Oviedo supported the candidacy of Juan Carlos Wasmosy in the internal
Colorado elections of December 1992, which turned out to be defining in Wasmosy
attaining the Colorado nomination. In a late April speech to the Ministry of the Interior,
Oviedo stated that the armed forces and the Colorado Party would rule Paraguay forever
and ever. Oviedo was becoming a very powerful political figure and openly campaigned
for the Colorado Party and its candidate, Wasmosy, for the 1993 presidential elections.
"This was a flagrant violation of the 1992 Constitution which expressly prohibited
political activity by members of the armed forces." 2 16
During the transition there were initial hopes of dismantling the civil-military
pact, but when the risk of a 1993 electoral defeat became a reality, this civil-military elite
resorted once again to utilizing the state apparatus in order to ensure a Colorado
victory.217 As a point in fact, Juan Carlos Wasmosy was picked as the Colorado Party
presidential candidate particularly because he was a civilian figure able to unite the party
with the military, and effectively maintain the civilian-military pact. Ironically, the
democratic transition produced a new military strongman in politics with obvious future
presidential aspirations in Lino Oviedo. Martini and Lezcano argue that Oviedo is the
product of a civil-military relationship that has been cemented over a half century and
215 Ibid.
216 Ibid.
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still remains in place. "Until the contradiction of the existence of a civilian-military pact
within the democratic state is resolved, there will be no shortage of other military figures
prepared to continue the long Paraguayan tradition of generals holding political
power."218 This is an important point to keep in mind since it cuts across several themes
that are treated in this thesis. One of these is civil-military relations within the context of
democratization in the region. Of the Southern Cone countries, Paraguay has the most
politicized military, this being a lasting legacy of the Stroessner era. The caudillo spirit,
if you may, runs deep in Paraguayan political culture and this is highlighted in the
number of factions (6 at one point) within the Colorado Party. Within the same party,
there are arch-enemies such as Oviedo and Argafa as we will see later. This emphasis on
personalism, as opposed to institutionalism, coupled with a politicized military runs
counter to democratic procedures and respect for constitutional restraint, allowing
ambitious generals like Oviedo to amass a lot of support and constantly test the
democratic process. The MERCOSUR organization, not exclusively since other
international actors play important roles, comes into play when institutional crises bring
this country to the brink of a military take-over. More than economic interests, the bloc's
international standing is threatened by the internal security problems of this country.
THE 1996 COUP AND MERCOSUR
THE WASMOSY- OVIEDO NEXUS
Military interference in the presidential elections of May 1993 was overt,
both in the choice of the party candidate and in the election campaign
217 Ibid. p. 7 1
218 Ibid.
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itself. This strengthened the argument that effective enforcement of the
constitutional prohibition on such military involvement in politics could
only be achieved through congressional control over military
appointments.2'
Wasmosy' s rise to power as president, while ensuring the control of Paraguay's
civil-military elite on the economic and political destiny of the country, did little to
sustain the power struggle within the elite. His victory had been made possible by the
support of Gen. Oviedo and Blas Riquelme, a businessman and important broker within
the Colorado Party.220 These two men had reluctantly supported Wasmosy because they
were afraid that Luis Maria Argana might take office. "Wasmosy was thus beholden to
the civil-military interests that had brought him to power."2 2 '
There were evident cracks within the alliance that had brought Wasmosy to power
only a few months after he was elected president. Faced with an opposition majority in
the new Congress and waning support within his own party (Foreign Minister Didgenes
Martinez and Colorado Party president Blas Riquelme resigned their government posts in
late 1993 and early 1994, respectively), Wasmosy signed a governability pact with the
PLRA (the Liberal Party), the Febrerista and Christian Democrat parties on January
219 Nickson, 1997a: 39-40.220Nickson, 1997b: 186.
221 Ibid. Regarding Luis Maria Argana (former head of the Supreme Court under the Stroessner regime and
former Minister of Foreign Relations under the Rodriguez administration) Marcial and Jorge Riquelme
point out that although a previous supporter of Rodriguez, "Argafia's repeated challenges to the authority of
Rodriguez, together with his campaign to de-militarise the Colorado Party (but not 'de-partisanise' the
military) made his candidacy unacceptable, both to Rodriguez and to the armed forces." Riquelme and
Riquelme, 1997: 58. They also point out that Wasmosy (a civil engineer, businessman, and prominent
figure within the powerful land-owners association, Asociaci6n Rural del Paraguay, who had never held a
party post and as a result had little influence within the party) was chosen by the military and Rodriguez to
be the Colorado presidential candidate for two reasons. "First, he represented the continuation of the
alliance between the armed forces, dominant economic interests and political elites within the Colorado
Party who had constituted the base of support for the Stroessner regime. Second, the choice of a 'business'
candidate was necessary to counter the appeal to the private sector of businessman Guillermo Caballero
Vargas, who was standing for the [Encuentro Nacional] EN." Riquelme and Riquelme, 1997: 57-8.
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1994.22 Even though the governability pact enabled the passage of legislation that
originated from the executive, such as measures for economic liberalization, it did not do
much as regards the necessary fundamental structural reforms to strengthen the
democratization process. 2 3
Wasmosy was initially opposed to reform of the armed forces. The main point of
contention was the issue of the entrenched privileges of the armed forces that were
inherited from the Stroessner era, and their repeated political interventions to defend
them. Congress displayed tremendous determination on this issue, and little progress was
made. Congress also expressed concerns over the quick rise of Oviedo (only three days
after Wasmosy's inauguration Oviedo was promoted to the head of the army). To the
opposition majority in Congress, the rise of Oviedo demonstrated that the military still
constituted a significant threat to the entire democratization process. "Consequently, the
issue of political interference by the military became the major source of conflict between
Wasmosy and Congress."2 Another key area of conflict between Congress and the
executive became the issue of party affiliation for serving members of the armed forces.
During the Stroessner regime, Colorado Party affiliation was a precondition for joining
the officer corps, but the 1992 Constitution barred all party affiliation in the future. The
222 Ibid. p. 187. Nickson states that the pact promised prior consultations with these parties regarding
proposed government legislation. The other major opposition party, the EN, decided not to be a signatory.
The new opposition alliance in Congress consisted of the EN, dissident Colorados of the MRC (the
Movimiento de Reconciliaci6n Colorado were a faction led by Argaia who were spiteful of the fradulent
manner in which Wasmosy had obtained the party's presidential nomination with military support despite
him having been defeated by Argaia in the party's primaries) and a minority faction of the PLRA. Ibid.
pp. 186-7.
223 Ibid. pp. 187-8.
224 Ibid. pp. 189-190. Nickson adds that "congressional opposition to a law hurriedly passed by the
outgoing Congress in July 1993 at the insistence of then President Rodriguez became the initial focus of
this conflict. This law had created a new post of Commander of the Military Forces between the president
and the head of the armed forces and congress feared that the new post-holder, rather than the president,
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1992 Constitution did not, however, rule on existing party affiliations. Congress rectified
this when on May 1994 it ratified Law 261, which suspended party affiliation for serving
members of the police and the armed forces. Wasmosy found himself with no choice but
to promulgate this law. 25  Lino Oviedo responded to this congressional decision by
campaigning against it in the armed forces and the Colorado Party. He continued
attending Colorado Party rallies and making public statements on political issues, despite
staunch opposition to this from Congress. "For many he now personified the threat posed
by the military to the democratisation process." 226
In late 1994 Wasmosy started distancing himself from Oviedo for fear that the
latter's growing ascendancy and his association with him was beginning to tarnish his
own democratic credentials. 227 In February 1995, Wasmosy promoted two generals
ahead of Oviedo in order to quell the latter's meteoric rise to power. A further sign of the
distrust between Oviedo and Wasmosy came on May of the same year when Wasmosy
and the opposition signed a pact in order to de-politicize the armed forces. Oviedo
reacted by staging a major public relations exercise in which his flag-waving supporters
called for him to become president.228
In late August 1995, Congress passed a motion ordering Oviedo's dismissal on
the grounds that he had disobeyed the constitutional ban on party involvement by serving
would exercise control over military appointments. Wasmosy vetoed its decision but on 9 December
Congress reasserted its original decision by rejecting the presidential veto. " Ibid. p. 190.
225 Ibid. p. 190.
226 Ibid.
227 Ibid. Nickson adds that this rift resulted in a serious military crisis on 18 December 1994. While
Wasmosy was attending a MERCOSUR summit meeting in Brazil, Oviedo unilaterally relieved General
Carlos Ayala of his command of the third infantry division, to transfer him to the Chaco garrison. Ayala
refused the order and the air force, which remained loyal to the president, put on a display of strength that
finally defused the situation. Upon his return, Wasmosy rescinded the order, and attributed the mix-up to a
misunderstanding with Oviedo. Ibid. pp. 190-1.
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members of the armed forces. It was decided by the judge in charge of the case that there
was insufficient evidence to support these charges and the suit was thrown out. Congress
persisted, however, with the attorney general appealing against the ruling, as the
congressional investigating committee took the case. The committee summoned Oviedo
to answer the charges in person, but he refused to show up citing that he needed
permission from Wasmosy to do so. As a result of its worsening rift with Oviedo,
Congress adopted a more conciliatory stance toward Wasmosy. In November, the senate
dropped a bill, designed specifically to stop Oviedo's presidential ambitions, which
called for the extension of the minimum period that a retired officer must wait until
running for public office from one year to three years7 2 9 "The worsening relationship
eventually came to a head on 22 April 1996 when Wasmosy dismissed Oviedo as head of
the army. Oviedo refused to obey the order, provoking a serious political crisis."230
INTERNATIONAL REACTION TO THE COUP
General Oviedo had attempted to postpone the internal Colorado Party elections,
which were to be held on Sunday, 28 April 1996.31 The internal elections had already
been postponed five times since their original date, which was on August 1995.232
228 Ibid. p. 191.
229 Ibid. p. 192.
238 Ibid.
231 La Naci6n newspaper, 04-23-96. Menem se solidariz6 con Wasmosy.
232 NotiSur - Latin American Political Affairs, 05-03-96. Paraguay: Threat of Coup by Defiant General
Averted. Analysts point out that the main catalyst for this crisis was political in-fighting prior to the
Colorado Party internal elections for the party presidency. This is a key post in choosing the presidential
candidate in the national elections. "Contenders for the top party post were vice president Seifart, who
Wasmosy backed and who had been favored to win before the crisis with Oviedo erupted; Luis Maria
Argafla, who was supported by allies of former dictator Stroessner; and Blas Riquelme, a business leader
who was backed by Oviedo and was committed to working for Oviedo's nomination as the Partido
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Besides this, the president was incensed with Oviedo because his allies in Congress had
blocked the award of a big bridge-construction contract to a firm owned by Wasmosy's
family. Moreover, Oviedo had been staging a public campaign against the president
for several weeks.234 All of this came to a head on the morning of April 2 3 rd when
Wasmosy signed decree calling for Oviedo's resignation as commander of the armed
forces for insubordination.235 The general, in turn, reacted by retreating to his military
headquarters and told Wasmosy to resign while threatening to bomb the presidential
residence unless a 7 p.m. deadline was not followed. "At this point, Wasmosy appears to
have lost his resolve." 236 Wasmosy apparently lost control of his country twice as he
went into hiding at the US embassy in Asunci6n on Monday, the 2 3 rd and again on the
following day as the bizarre episode unfolded, prompting observers to believe that
Oviedo was orchestrating a coup.237
International reaction to the coup attempt was immediate, and turned out to be
defining in preserving democracy in Paraguay. The presidents of Paraguay's
MERCOSUR partners spoke to each other and to President Wasmosy on the first day of
the crisis offering their full support. The permanent council of the OAS began a special
session in its headquarters on Tuesday to discuss the situation in Paraguay, while Cesar
Gaviria flew to Paraguay to help mediate the situation.23 8  The United States State
Department expressed "serious concern" over the situation in Paraguay while the U.S.
233 The Economist Newspaper. 04-27-96. Paraguay. Backard march. This article argues that Wasmosy
is himself much to blame for the crisis since upon losing a party vote for the Colorado presidential
candidacy in 1993, Wasmosy had turned to Gen. Oviedo who had the decision reversed. Later, and as a
result, Wasmosy was able to control Oviedo's frequent politicking. Ibid.
234 Gazeta Mercantil, 04-23-96. International pressure against the coup in Paraguay,
235 Facts on File World News Digest, 05-02-96. Constitutional Crisis Resolved.
236 Nickson, 1997b: 192.
23' Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 04-27-96. Paraguay's president was ousted twice in standoff with general.
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suspended military aid and threatened to suspend economic assistance should Oviedo
take power. 239 Foreign emissaries told Oviedo that Wasmosy's forced removal would not
be tolerated by the international community 24 0
Within MERCOSUR, President Cardoso of Brazil summoned his military
advisors to evaluate possible repercussions of the Paraguayan crisis.241 The Brazilian
ambassador to England at the time, Rubens Barbosa, stated that Brazil, Argentina, and
Uruguay would not hesitate to act if the dispute between Wasmosy and Oviedo
deteriorated into a full-scale coup. Argentine Foreign Minister Guido Di Tella echoed
that sentiment by asserting that if there was a coup, there would be immediate
international isolation for Paraguay.242 At stake for MERCOSUR in particular was its
international credibility as a regional bloc.24 3 Granted, a Paraguayan departure from the
trade union would mean little to the region in economic terms given Paraguay's small
size and limited economic importance, but politically it would have meant a serious
setback for MERCOSUR. The 1990 Act of Buenos Aires accord between Argentina and
Brazil, which later in 1991 incorporated Paraguay and Uruguay when they joined
MERCOSUR, had asserted that democracy was considered to be an essential element for
regional integration in the Southern Cone.244  Only by showing credibility could
238 Xinhua News Agency, 04-23-96. OAS Permanent Council meets on Paraguay.
239 Ibid.
240 Nickson, 1997b: 192.
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244 Ibid. Comellas adds that the democratic basis of the MERCOSUR is only the second of its kind after
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MERCOSUR become a trustworthy partner for other countries and blocs, in turn
becoming a more attractive area for foreign investment and so on.245
Representatives from the MERCOSUR countries, the OAS, the US and several
representatives from countries in the Rio Group were present for the intense
negotiations that occurred during the Wasmosy-Oviedo stand off.246 At the time of the
Oviedo threat, Wasmosy had been ready to resign, but neighboring South American
countries went as far as to offer Wasmosy military support if it was necessary.247 An
agreement was reached whereby Oviedo would receive the post of defense minister in
exchange for his resignation. Yet, OAS leaders as well as opposition Paraguayan parties
in Congress rejected the bargain. On the night of April 24, thousands of demonstrators
from opposition parties, labor unions and student groups, angered by this decision,
clamored that democracy was being compromised and called for the president to reverse
the decision. Claiming that popular displeasure with the decision made him break his
commitment with Oviedo, Wasmosy rescinded on his offer a few days later and Oviedo
did not receive the cabinet post after all. On the following day, Oviedo launched his
1998 presidential campaign, calling himself of all things 'a soldier of democracy' 248
THE SHORT-LIVED CUBAS PRESIDENCY
In what was seen as the first of many administration changes following the
crisis, on April 27 [1996] Finance Minister Raul Cubas Grau resigned.
Although he had only been in office for ten days, he was a staunch Oviedo
245 Ibid.
246 Ibid.
247Facts on File World News Digest, 05-02-96. Constitutional Crisis Resolved. Despite the fact that the
Air Force and Marines supported Wasmosy, 32 of 42 army generals supported Oviedo. This was
significant because the army accounted for 70% of the country's armed forces.
248 Ibid. Their italics.
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supporter and was thought to be heavily involved in the move to oust the
president. Wasmosy named Carlos Alberto Facetti to succeed Cubas
Grau.2 49
The crisis over and in full control, Wasmosy proceeded to sack 21 military
officers, 11 generals and 10 colonels, all key Oviedo supporters.2 0 Later, in December
1996, in a further attempt to bring the armed forces under his full control, Wasmosy
dismissed another 225 officers who had remained loyal to the ex-general.2 5  Wasmosy
also tried to bring Oviedo to justice. Interestingly, during a 1996 Congressional inquiry
about the aborted coup, Oviedo defended himself by claiming that he had not initiated the
coup but had acted in opposition to a Wasmosy self-coup, for which, according to
Oviedo, Wasmosy had sought his support.252 In order to prevent Oviedo from seeking
the Colorado nomination for the 1998 presidential election, Wasmosy tried to bring him
to justice by having a military tribunal convict Oviedo for rebelling. After serving 55
days in prison on charges of insubordination and sedition, the Asunci6n Appellate Court
ordered Oviedo released on 8 August 1996.253 Soon after his release he formed a new
faction within the Colorado Party, the Union Nacional de Colorados Eticos (UNACE),
and announced that he would run for president in the 1998 elections. 2 4
49 NotiSur - Latin American Political Affairs, 05-03-96. Paraguay: Threat of Coup by Defiant General
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Cleared of these charges, Oviedo started his campaigning for the 1998 presidency
throughout the Paraguayan countryside. Oviedo was very popular in the interior given
his humble upbringing, fluency in the Indian Guarani language, and because of several
public works projects in the region that were financed through the military budget.2 A
charismatic speaker, Oviedo ran on a populist, anti-corruption platform. Unsurprisingly,
Oviedo openly sought to maintain the military officer corps prerogatives.256 The
campaign strategy worked, and in September 1997 Oviedo won the Colorado Party
presidential primary by defeating Argafa as well as Wasmosy's hand picked candidate,
Carlos Facetti.25 7 Wasmosy, however, responded by claiming that the elections were
fraudulent. Paradoxically, he allied himself in this endeavor with Argafa, the man
whom, with Oviedo's help, he had fraudulently defeated in the Colorado primaries
several years before en route to the presidency.
Upon his return from visiting the Argentine and Uruguayan heads of state on
October 3 rd, Oviedo was handed a presidential order for 30 days of disciplinary prison for
slanderous remarks that he made against Wasmosy.i Oviedo went into 'hiding' and
campaigned for 41 days, before finally turning himself in. On the eve of his scheduled
release on January 1998, however, a court ordered him to be held indefinitely due to the
continuing investigation of the 1996 uprising.259 Then, early in March, a military tribunal
convicted Oviedo with rebellion for mobilizing troops in opposition to the president's
2ss NotiSur - Latin American Political Affairs, 05-03-96. Paraguay: Threat of Coup by Defiant General
Averted.
256 Arturo Valenzuela, 1997: 47.
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-
From Jail.
73
order to dismiss him and sentenced him with 10 years of prison. This military court
ruling, however, had to be approved by the Paraguayan Supreme Court for Oviedo's
candidacy to be nullified. 260 With a worried eye on the Paraguayan situation, Brazilian
president Cardoso expressed to Domingo Laino (Liberal Party and main opposition
candidate in the 1998 elections), during his visit to Brasilia, the importance of the
democratic clause of the MERCOSUR, "which demands institutional normality as a pre-
condition for membership of the bloc."261
In a 5-4 vote, the Paraguayan Supreme Court approved the Military Court's
conviction of Oviedo for insubordination, and effectively nullified his candidacy as the
Colorado Party's nominee for the presidential election. 2 62 His running mate, Raul Cubas
Grau replaced him as that party's candidate with Luis Maria Argafa (then party
president) as his running mate. An apparent boost for the campaign of the main
opposition candidate, Domingo Laino, was not enough to keep the Colorados from their
reign in power as Cubas won the presidency on May 1998 by 54% of the popular vote.263
Only three days after his August 1 5 th inauguration, Cubas released Oviedo from
prison by presidential decree. This caused a great deal of criticism, even from. vice-
president Argana, who called the decree an "exotic interpretation of the law". 264 On
August 2 0th, only five days after being inaugurated president, Congress members from
both the opposition and Colorado parties petitioned Congress's lower house to initiate
260 Carlos Montero, Inter Press Service, 04-14-98, Paraguay: Wasmosy Will Stand His Ground.
261 Ibid.
262 The Associated Press, 04-17-98. Former General's Candidacy Ends as Court Upholds Prison Sentence.
263 Stephen Brown. Manchester Guardian Weekly, 05-17-98. Ruling Party Wins Paraguay Elections.
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impeachment proceedings for abuse of power.265 The Oviedo issue would hound Cubas
throughout his seven months in office. The ensuing episode climaxed with the tragic
death of vice-president Argafa on May of 1999, and Oviedo's alleged involvement in it.
Of particular interest to this thesis is the active role played by Brazil and Argentina
during the aftermath of that crisis, and MERCOSUR's active involvement in Paraguay's
internal politics.
REGIONAL DIPLOMACY IN RESPONSE TO INTERNAL CRISES
Several times during the crisis, [Brazilian President] Cardoso underlined
that any rupture of the democratic systems would entail Paraguay's
automatic expulsion from Mercosur, under the 'democratic clause'
(formally, the Ushuaia Protocol) signed in mid 1996-appositely, in
response to General Lino Oviedo's rebellion a few months earlier. 266
At 8:50 a.m. on 23 March 1999, three gunmen murdered Paraguayan vice-
president Luis Maria Argafia, who was on his way to work. The gu en, dressed in
military fatigues, escaped the scene of the crime.267 Argafa supporters and Senate
President Luis Gonzalez Macchi accused Cubas and Oviedo of being the masterminds
behind the assassination. This resulted in a full-blown political and institutional crisis,
"which triggered six days of violent clashes in which six people died and a further 130
were injured." Those deaths and countless injuries occurred when snipers opened fire
on the crowds during a March 26 manifestation in the capital's central square, in which
265 Ibid.
266 Latin American Weekly Report, 03-30-99. Solution of Paraguayan crisis was first success of Mercosur
Democratic Clause.
267 T erer6 News, 03-30-99. Como Ocurrio el Brutal Atentado.
268 Agence France Presse, 03-30-99. Former Paraguayan president flees to Brazil.
75
protestors for and against the impeachment were demonstrating. The snipers were
believed to be members of Oviedo's UNACE faction. 269
Prior to the assassination, it appeared that Cubas would emerge victorious from
his impeachment struggle with Congress and the Supreme Court since it was unlikely that
his opposition could garner the necessary two-thirds majority in Congress to unseat
him.270 Yet, the tragic events that began with the Argafa assassination completely
altered his situation. During the March 26 demonstrations, Cubas's police commander
had ordered his forces to remain aloof to the sniper shootings, adding credence to those
on the opposition that laid the blame of this malefaction to Oviedo, and by way of
extension to Cubas. Cubas tried to remedy the situation by dismissing the chief of police,
but he was unable to alleviate the tense atmosphere. Rumors of a coup spread as troops
and an armored unit marched toward the capital. Meanwhile, Congress proclaimed that
Cubas had two days to prepare his defense to impeachment charges for unconstitutionally
pardoning Oviedo from his prison sentence seven months before. Late Sunday on March
28, hours before the congressional vote on his impeachment, Cubas resigned and on the
following day was granted political asylum in Brazil.2 7 1
At the onset of the crisis, the Argentine and Brazilian ambassadors, U.S. and
Vatican envoys, among others, all worked at finding a solution to this latest threat to
Paraguayan democracy. 2 72 The Brazilian ambassador to Paraguay, Bernardo Pericas,
269 Latin American Weekly Report, 04-13-99. Andrew Nickson is quoted as he points out that the snipers
were captured on camera and one man was arrested. He was linked both to this incident and the Argala
assassination. Ibid.
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kept in close contact with the warring parties in Paraguay, as attempts at a deal were
hammered. F.H. Cardoso spoke to his MERCOSUR counterparts, Julio Sanguinetti of
Uruguay and Carlos Menem of Argentina, as well as Bill Clinton of the USA with
regards the crisis. 73  Cardoso's role was decisive as a deal was reached whereby
Gonzalez Macchi became the head of a government of 'national unity', while Cubas and
Oviedo were granted political asylum. "It was clinched by a personal telephone call from
Cardoso to Cubas on Sunday, hours before the latter publicly announced that he was
stepping down." 74
The Cardoso government witnessed the Paraguayan situations with grave concern,
and went as far as putting its own military forces on alert should they be needed.2 75
Brazil sent 50 policemen and 30 marines, all armed with automatic weapons, to
accompany Cubas and his family to a Brazilian air force plane. He was flown out of
Paraguay and given political asylum in Brazil. Brazilian foreign minister, Luiz
Lampreia, explained his government's decision by noting Paraguay's strategic
importance to Brazil. Paraguay is home to over 300,000 Brazilians, is a Mercosur partner
and is the site of the Itaipd plant. Lampreia added that his government ultimately sought
Paraguayan stability, and that Cubas would not be allowed to involve himself in any
political activity while in political asylum.276
27 Terere News, 03-30-99. Cardoso Tuvo un Papel Esencial para la Renuncia de Cubas.
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It is of interest to this thesis that Brazilian armed security forces went into
Paraguay to collect the ex-president. The Paraguayan situation was so serious that
international diplomatic mediation was apparently not enough. The threat of force was
thus a necessary component in Brazil's mediation. This threat was subtle in the form of
an unlikely military intervention and overt in that armed guards went into Asuncion to
protect the well being of their out-going president. The differences of power between
Paraguay and Brazil are unquestionable, and Brazil's stake in the former's stability has
been pointed out, but is it the fact that both are MERCOSUR partners the main reason
why Brazil did what it did? To put it differently, without MERCOSUR would Brazil
intervene in this manner? To speculate, I would argue that it would have for the simple
reason that they share the Itaipd plant, which is significantly important to Brazil. Brazil
was playing its role of sub-regional hegemon. As the most powerful country of the
region, its influence carries a certain undeniable weight in situations of this nature. It is
noteworthy that at the hemispheric level, the clear hegemonic power is the United States.
At the sub-regional level, the Southern Cone for instance, the most powerful states step
up their efforts to intervene in local international crises. This is in fact very consistent
with the present global emphasis on joint regional action to resolve crises that go beyond
the control of a single government. In this context, it seems only natural that this
multilateral action is to be led by the strongest regional actors. One could then argue that
more than anything else Brazil was exercising its hegemonic sub-regional role, one that is
facilitated by the present global environment of regional multilateralism. Membership in
MERCOSUR also justifies and facilitates Brazilian, and Argentine, intervention in
Paraguayan during crisis situations. Furthermore, common membership to MERCOSUR
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provides Brazil with added incentives in Paraguayan stability, as it is necessary for the
bloc to maintain its international image as an organization that is backed by democratic
governance. MERCOSUR may increase the interaction and interests between these
countries, but it does not change the fact that the other Mercosur members view Paraguay
with distrust. This is witnessed by the fact that the Paraguayan military has yet to
participate in joint military exercises with the other Mercosur countries.277 The author
believes that this was a case of finding a 'salida' (way out) to this latest Paraguayan
institutional crisis by whatever means possible. A salida is not a solution, per say, but
has been an interesting Latin American theme during crisis situations when an immediate
solution is not feasible and finding an immediate exit from the crisis becomes imperative.
On the same day that Cubas was granted political asylum in Brazil, Oviedo was
transferred to Argentina under a similar arrangement. Argentine president Carlos Menem
confirmed that before granting Oviedo asylum, he consulted with the foreign ministries
of the other Mercosur members.27  According to an Argentine foreign ministry
spokesman, Argentina consulted with the US, Bolivia, Chile and its Mercosur partners
before making a decision.279 This was important because Oviedo fled the country, with
criminal charges pending. Despite complaints on the Paraguayan side in this regard,
Menem stated that Paraguay did not put forth a request of extradition for the ex-general,
and that an extradition treaty between Argentina and Paraguay is non-existent. 80
277 El Pais, Spain. 03-31-99.
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Interestingly, the present government coalition of Gonzilez Macchi apparently
knew of an extraordinary military tribunal resolution (2/99), which gave Oviedo
protective liberty so that he may seek asylum in Argentina, and kept it silent.21 Macchi
claimed no knowledge of it as his incoming government hurriedly faxed the Argentine
Foreign Ministry an extradition request for the former general. Curiously, Walter Bower,
president of the Chamber of Deputies at the time, had knowledge of the resolution before
the plaza shooting but made no mention of it in the following days.282 He is presently
the Minister of the Interior. This example lends itself to the theory that the incoming
Paraguayan government in fact wanted Oviedo out of the country, and did not ever really
intend to extradite him from Argentina. But why then the ensuing rift between the
Gonzalez Macchi and Menem governments with respect to the Oviedo issue?
THE DETRIMENT OF PA R AGUA YAN RELA TIONS WITH A RGENTNA AND
URUGUAY
Insecurity and conflicts at the domestic level pose a dilemma for
regionalism. In many ways these are the most serious conflicts
confronting developing countries. They can also spill over into
neighboring countries and strain interstate relations or give rise to
interstate conflict with negative consequences for regionalism.283
The Oviedo asylum caused dissention within Argentine political circles from the
onset. Vice-president Carlos Ruckauf stated that Oviedo should leave because former
coup leaders are not welcome in Argentina. He was quoted "we do not want our country
21 ABC Color, 4-15-99. Copula gobernante sabia que huy6 Oviedo.
282 Ibid.
28 Alagappa, 1995: 174.
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to conspire against Paraguay" 2 84 On the other hand, the former president and member of
the opposition Radical Party, Raul Alfonsin, agreed with Menem's decision arguing that
a service was being provided to Paraguayan democracy.285 Alternatively, Fernando De la
Rua (currently the Argentine president-elect and also a Radical) disagreed with Menem's
decision. Argentine Deputy Foreign Minister, Andres Cisneros, justified his
government's decision by stating that it was based on a desire to keep MERCOSUR's
political image from being damaged throughout the world, fearing an unconstitutional
political change in Paraguay.2 86
On April 30, the Uruguayan government granted political asylum to Jose Segovia
Boltes, a retired general and minister of defense during the Cubas administration. Boltes
claimed that he and his family were in danger due to political persecution and threats.
Boltes, an ardent Oviedo supporter, was being sought after by Paraguayan authorities for
allegedly embezzling US$ 400,000 of public funds while serving as defense minister.287
While acting as interim president (Gonzalez Macchi out of the country, taking part in an
economic summit in Chile), Paraguayan Senator Juan Carlos Galaverna criticized the
Uruguayan government of having hypocritical relations with his country and accused the
Argentine ambassador to Asunci6n, Nestor Auad, of being an Oviedo collaborator. Both
the Argentine and Uruguayan governments expressed their displeasure with those
comments. The Uruguayan government went as far as to state that since Paraguay
occupied the pro tempore MERCOSUR presidency they would refuse to attend the
284 Tererb News, 03-30-99. Vicepresidentepide un gesto a Oviedo: "Que se vaya". Quote translated from
Spanish and taken from this article.
285 Clarin Digital, 03-31-99. Menem confirm6 las consultas.
286 Telam News Agency, 03-30-99. Argentine minister says Oviedo asylum decision was to protect
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Asunci6n summit meeting in July. The Uruguayan ambassador to Asuncion was
recalled as a further sign of the deteriorating relations between these two governments.2
It took a telephone conversation a few weeks later between Luis Sanguinetti and Macchi
to partially remedy the situation.
The inviolability of asylum in favor of those persecuted for political reasons was
established in the 1889 Montevideo Treaty of International Penal Rights. Moreover, The
American Declaration of Rights and Duties of Man (Bogota, 1948), and the American
Convention on Human Rights (San Jose, Costa Rica in 1969) guarantee all persons the
right to seek and obtain asylum in a foreign country in the case that persecution is not
motivated due to a common crime 290 This latter stipulation allows the country providing
asylum a broad range of legal interpretation. The applicable Argentine law with respect
to extradition is the International Cooperation in Penal Matters Law #24.767. The
executive can reject only extradition requests that are not presented in the proper legal
manner. Once a request is properly made, article 111 of the above law establishes that
the judiciary determines whether or not he is to be extradited.2 91
In Oviedo's case, the attempted coup is not a common crime and has political
underpinnings, so that basis of Paraguay's request is negated based on the above treaties
and agreements and his extradition should be refused. Another charge involved Oviedo's
alleged involvement in the central plaza shootings after he apparently gave orders to Nio
287 Terer News, 05-03-99. Diputados explican su rechazo a concesi6n de asilo a Segovia.
288 Clarin, 05-07-99. Paraguay, contra Argentina y Uruguay.
289 Terer News, 05-09-99. Cancilleres de Uruguay y Paraguay inician el proceso para normalizar las
relaciones.
290 La Nacion, 04-08-99. Editorial II, Oviedo y el asilo politico.
291 Marcelo Stubrin, La Naci6n, 09-10-99. Los valores en juego.
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Trinidad (the soon thereafter deposed police commander) to have his men stand idle.
This, if proven, is an example of a common crime and not one of which Oviedo would
unjustly be persecuted for political reasons. Based on that charge, the extradition should
be granted.
In July 28, Paraguayan magistrate Jorge Bogarin Gonzilez formally requested
Oviedo's extradition based on an ongoing investigation regarding his alleged
involvement in the Argana assassination.2 92 Hailed as the first formal and serious
Paraguayan request by Argentine government sources, presidency secretary Carlos
Corach reassured his Paraguayan counterparts that the judiciary would treat the matter
with impartiality. 293 Amidst accusations that Oviedo was involved in political activity,
which is prohibited during political asylum, on September 2 nd the Argentine Foreign
Ministry rejected the Paraguayan extradition request. Foreign minister Di Tella signed
the rejection without passing it to the judiciary, as should have been the case. This
request was rejected on the basis of a stipulation in law 24.767 that impedes refugees to
be sent to the country from where they sought refuge. Yet, Lino Oviedo was granted
political asylum, and therefore was not a refugee.2 94
Almost simultaneously, the Uruguayan government rejected a Paraguayan
extradition request for Jose Boltes, which was based on charges that he too was involved
in the Argaffa murder. The Gonzalez Macchi government expressed its indignation
stating that Argentina and Uruguay were obstructing proper Paraguayan judicial
procedures while contributing to impunity at a time when Paraguay attempted to
292 La Naci6n, 07-29-99. Unjuez paraguayo pidi6 la extradicion de Lino Oviedo.
293 La Naci6n, 08-04-99. Oviedo no contaria ya con el respaldo argentino.
294 La Naci6n, 09-05-99. Oviedo un alto costo politico.
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consolidate its democracy. To Macchi, these gestures could only impede the common
process of regional integration.2 95
The results of the rejection to the Oviedo extradition request were on the whole
negative for the bilateral relations between Argentina and Paraguay. Members of the
Alianza coalition (made up of the Radical and Frente Solidario del Pais [FREPASO]
parties) solicited a political lawsuit against Di Tella for his rejection to the request. This
request was based on article 15 of the Montevideo Treaty, which establishes that any
extradition request has to be passed on to the judiciary.296 In Paraguay, Macchi asked for
the resignation of Foreign Minister Miguel Abdon Saguier. Further, the Paraguayan
ambassador to Buenos Aires, Leila Rachid, was recalled to Asunci6n.297 What ensued
was a mud slinging campaign between the respective governments. Among those
accusations, the most serious one involved Paraguayan Senator Luis Alberto Mauro who
accused Menem, Argentine Defense Minister Jorge Dominguez, and Oviedo of being
involved in corrupt business activities that included fraudulent use of funds, originating
from the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank, that were intended for
joint construction of the Yacyreti dam.298 After categorically denying these allegations,
Menem demanded an apology from the Paraguayan government, which he did not
receive. To make matters worse, an agreed upon September 9 meeting between the two
heads of state to discuss the Oviedo issue was cancelled at the last minute. Menem
pointed out that his government's posture regarding the Oviedo issue would now be more
295 La Naci6n, 09-04-99. Gonzdlez Macchi: un gesto inamistoso.
296 La Naci6n, 09-04-99. Solicitan el juicio politico de Di Tella.
297 La Naci6n, 09-04-99. Paraguay llama a su embajador en la Argentina.
298 La Naci6n, 09-10-99. Yacyretd sigue bajo la lupa.
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rigid given the insults that several Paraguayan legislators and functionaries threw his
way. To date, the Oviedo asylum issue has not been resolved.
Maybe the best way out of the current impasse was suggested by Macchi when he
stated that the extradition requests to Argentina and Uruguay will be suspended until
there is a more propitious climate to do so, meaning after new presidents take office in
the respective countries at the end of the year.299 Interestingly, deposed Paraguayan
foreign minister, Miguel Saguier, suggested that the accusations handed to Menem by
Paraguayan legislators have a double intent, namely that Oviedo not be extradited.300
Argentine interior security secretary, Miguel Angel Toma, similarly expressed that
Paraguayan authorities have been hypocritical in that they continually ask for Oviedo's
extradition, while sending covert messages telling the Argentine government to not even
think about sending Oviedo back to Paraguay.301 It will be interesting to see what the De
la Rua government does with respect to this issue. I believe that Macchi's bluff will be
called and Oviedo will be sent back to Paraguay or to another country. One has to worry
about what the consequences of an Oviedo return to Paraguay would mean for the fragile
and turbulent democratic transition that this country is undergoing. It should not be
forgotten that this man has been the main threat to Paraguayan democracy by bringing
this country to the brink both in 1996 and in 1999. Moreover, he and his allies have
played a role in disrupting Paraguayan relations with Argentina and Uruguay. It is no
less disconcerting that the people running Paraguay at the moment are for the most part
former allies of General Stroessner.
299 La Naci&, 09-04-99. Paraguay lamo a su embajador en la Argentina.
300 La Naci6n, 09-10-99. Sospechas de Saguier sobre denuncias de legisladores.
La Naci6n, 10-05-99. Toma: Paraguay tiene doble mensaje.
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CHAPTER 4
In order to take on a security role, regional organizations would need to
overcome an obstacle and resolve a paradox. They would need to possess
the requisite financial, institutional and military capability to play a
regional conflict management role. Regional arrangements would also
need to be synchronous with the regional security complexes which
emphasize the interdependence of rivalry as well as that of shared
interests. That is, all parties that are central to a regional security complex
must be included within the regional arrangements for the latter to have
any real meaning.3
This concluding chapter is divided into two sections. The first section examines
salient security issues among the MERCOSUR countries. I will discuss advances as well
as setbacks that have emerged in the relations between the MERCOSUR members (this
includes associate members as well, as Argentine-Chilean relations will be discussed)
within the framework of integration and increased interaction. This is done in keeping
with the central question, which asks whether regional economic integration is conducive
to the establishment of cooperative security mechanisms.
The concluding section of this thesis analyzes and qualifies the stated central
question of this project in light of the evidence that has been presented. Some salient
regional trends in the security arena will be revisited as I attempt to determine the impact
that these may have, not only on the internal processes of democratization these countries
are undergoing, but how these trends affect and bring into play other regional actors. The
hegemonic regional role played by the United States will also be discussed given its lead
in multilateral intervention throughout the hemisphere. For the purposes of this thesis, it
is worth noting that US initiatives temper the unilateral and multilateral actions of the
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Southern Cone countries, as they attempt to alter their own regional strategic balance. In
the present post Cold War context, the Paraguayan case is one of many recent examples
that demonstrate the prominent leading role by the US and the OAS in promoting
democracy as well as collective action toward the resolution of "common" threats to
security in the region. I will conclude that the Paraguayan case also shows that the main
MERCOSUR countries have come to increasingly assert their influence at the sub-
regional security level, and may come to play a much larger security role if the present
nature of inter-American relations continues.
POST COLD WAR SECURITY IN THE SOUTHERN CONE
The implementation of integration treaties brings into question old
conceptualizations of traditional conflicts among neighboring countries. If
these agreements are successful and permanent supranational institutions
develop, a debate concerning what types of armed forces and defense
policies are called for under such new conditions will become
inevitable. 03
Is economic integration conducive to security cooperation? The obvious answer
would appear to be yes, yet neither the Chilean nor the Brazilian governments were
particularly happy for Argentina when it was named an extra-NATO ally of the United
States in mid-1997. Do these governments still view each other with distrust? I would
argue that they do and this may be cause for concern given that democracy is not
completely consolidated anywhere in Latin America, and neo-liberal economic policies,
despite initial macroeconomic successes, are having serious societal repercussions such
302 Thakur, 1997: 71.
303 Millet and Gold-Biss, 1995: 68.
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as dangerously high levels of unemployment even in the most developed countries of the
region.
Upon learning that Argentina had been named an extra-NATO ally of the U.S.,
Chilean foreign minister Jose Insulza flew to Washington immediately to express his
government's concern over this matter. He did this despite the fact that Menem had an
interview with [Chilean president] Eduardo Frei the day before to forewarn Chile of the
upcoming U.S. decision. Di Tella did the same thing with Brazil, Argentina's main
strategic ally. Jorge Dominguez stated that this newly acquired status did not mean that
Argentina would attain ultramodern weapons from the U.S., despite Chile's interest in
purchasing F-16 airplanes from the United States.304 Chilean fears were not unwarranted,
however. During a visit from Argentine General Martin Balza to General Charles
Wilhelm of the U.S. Southern Command, the 'new military roles' against narcotics
trafficking and terrorism were discussed, as was the possibility of Argentina's ability to
purchase certain military equipment given its extra-NATO ally status.305 The end of the
U.S. arms embargo to Latin American countries facilitates the sale of modern weaponry
to these nations.
With respect to this issue, there are recurring fears that the sale of modern
weaponry to Latin America will divert funds from other programs, exacerbate existing
tensions, and risk re-igniting arms races.306 Jimmy Carter, who established the arms
prohibition during his presidency, argued that lifting the ban would open up a Pandora's
box in the region. Also, Bernard Aronson, undersecretary of state for Latin American
304 Clarin, 8-14-97. Luz verde a una alianza militar.
305 Clarin, 2-18-98. Balza recibi6 elogios del jefe del Comando Sur de EE UU
306 Millet, 1997: 125.
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Affairs during the Bush administration, stated that surely this will plant the seeds for an
arms race and will cause problems for Argentina, which is one of the best U.S. allies in
the region.307 Others, like U.S. secretary of state William Cohen, retort that Latin
American countries must modernize their armed forces and that a prohibition of weapons
sales on the part of the United States, within the democratic context of the region, would
be paternalistic. Of course, there is a substantial economic interest on the part of the U.S.
weapons industry, which contributed US$11 million to Clinton's re-election campaign.308
Senator Jose Samey of Brazil was quoted "we can not accept new military
expenses; we have other priorities. But if our neighboring countries do so, we can not
refrain from doing so ourselves." 309  In the context of civil-military relations, it is
noteworthy that arms production has a higher level of correlation with the degree of
political power exercised by the armed forces than do budgets.310 One could argue that
arms purchases may have a higher correlation still.
It becomes apparent that there are serious obstacles for security integration in the
Southern Cone. Political corruption and social inequalities do not bode well for regime
stability.311 Sub-regional trade integration as a cooperation paradigm also brings up a
number of pragmatic considerations that could impede security cooperation. "Since so
many prospective trade partners were once perceived as the enemy by militaries that
perennially planned to defend against territorial aggression, the shift to defense
cooperation with the same nations implies a fundamental redefinition of the strategic
307 Christopher Marquis, El Nuevo Herald, 6-6-97.
308 Ibid.
309 Ibid.
310 Acufia and Smith, 1996: 225.
31" Thomas Sheetz, 1996: 407.
89
environment."312 It can be safely be stated that an arms race between the Southern Cone
MERCOSUR countries would impede any and all efforts that have been made to shift the
strategic paradigm from one of distrust and competition to one of cooperation and
understanding. Several strategically important countries, like Brazil and Peru, have
refused to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and that it would be possible, though
unlikely, for Argentina and Brazil to renew their efforts to develop missiles or weapons
of mass destruction if their domestic regimes were to change in the future.313
Regarding Argentine-Chilean relations, there have been significant improvements
in the last few years. In February of this year, these two countries finally resolved the
last of their original 24 territorial disputes. Also, during a February 16 presidential
meeting, Frei stated that Argentina's extra NATO ally status does not break the regional
equilibrium with respect to strength and military equipment. In fact, both governments
reached an unprecedented agreement to audit each other's military expenditures
beginning in the year 2000. The mediation rules for this are to be established by the
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) of the United
Nations. 14  The Argentine and Chilean navies also began joint military exercises in
August 1998. At the time, Argentine admiral Carlos Marr6n expressed pride in the
exercises and stated that these initiatives help break the common logic of suspicion and
antagonism. Moreover, if the auditing of military expenditures actually occurs it will
mark a huge turning point in the military relations of these two countries, who almost
went to war twenty-one years ago. Frei stated that since the last Argentine-Chilean
312 Downes, 1996: 7.
3 Albert Coll, 1997: 49.
1 Pablo Calvo. Clarin, 02-17-99. Acuerdo con Chile para controlar gastos militares.
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territorial dispute is resolved, the economic association could now be furthered.316 In this
case at least it appears that security cooperation will result in further economic
integration, and not vice versa. Then again, Chile is already an associate member of
MERCOSUR.
Alternatively, relations between the two main MERCOSUR countries, Argentina
and Brazil, have steadily deteriorated within the past year. The February Brazilian
devaluation affected the entire region, and Uruguay and Paraguay expressed their
discontent to this as well. Due to the devaluation, Brazilian exports have been cheaper
and have consequently flooded its partners' markets, while it has become more expensive
for them to export to Brazil. There is an ongoing case, now being handled by the World
Trade Organization (WTO), regarding the imposition of Argentine trade barriers to
Brazilian textile products, which the Brazilians claim is a violation to the Common
External Tariff (CET) of the agreement. This case has gone to the WTO because the
respective governments failed to negotiate an agreement, and there is not a supranational
court in MERCOSUR to handle disputes of this nature. Also, the Brazilian government
became incensed when on August 8, the Menem administration formally applied to
NATO for consideration as an associate member. "Itamaraty [Brazilian Foreign
Ministry] noted that it had not been consulted, and that such a development 'would
introduce extraneous elements into the context of South American regional security' "317
Of concern to Brazil is that Argentina's active diplomacy in the context of a redefining
international security system will give it an advantage over Brazil in their competition
315 Telm, Ushuaia, 08-10-98.
316 Pablo Calvo. Clarin, 02-17-99. Acuerdo con Chile para controlar gastos militares.
317 Southern Cone Report, 08-03-99. Menem appliesfor Nato link.
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over a perranent seat on the UN Security Council. The crisis sparked by the
Argentine request soon made it to the commercial area. The Argentine application was
rejected by NATO.
In light of the De la Rua victory in the Argentine October presidential elections,
the Brazilian government wants to look past the NATO issue. Asked about Argentine-
Brazilian military relations, Luiz Lampreia responded that "Argentina's request to join
NATO has not facilitated relations but I think the issue is over and I live in hope that we
shall talk again about a military rapprochement and carry out the planned joint military
exercises." 319 According to a high level Brazilian government official, between eight and
nine government ministries have direct interests in Argentina.30 Therefore, these latest
Argentine presidential elections were viewed as critical to Brazil and its relations with its
neighbor, particularly in light of the tense relationship these two have had in the past
months. Brazil is concerned about Argentina's flirtation with dollarizing its economy. In
fact, they are more fearful of this than an Argentine devaluation. "It is not possible to
have a Mercosur partner whose monetary policy is determined by the Federal Reserve of
the U.S. It would be a total retreat for the bloc. We could not even think about
coordinating macroeconomic policies."321
The Brazilian government views the Argentine change of government with
optimism. They contend that a re-launching of Mercosur is necessary, and that with a
new government in Argentina this is possible. Included in this proposed re-launching is a
318 Ibid.
319 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 10-15-99. Brazil to propose Mercosur relaunch to new Argentine
government, minister says. Original source 'O Estado de Sao Paulo' 10-13-99.
320 La Naci6n, 10-24-99. Descuentan en Brasil la victoria de De la Rua.
321 Ibid.
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political commitment to the bloc in an operational sense, which includes rescuing
abandoned aspects of the original agreement. These include macroeconomic
coordination, as well as integration in areas such as services, government procurement
and the labor market. Brazilian Senator Jose Samey stated that the future of the bloc
depends on a reformulation of MERCOSUR's underlying concepts, as well as putting the
creation of a common market back on the agenda.322 Brazil is also content that De la Rda
plans to emphasize his country's foreign policy more on its MERCOSUR partners and
Europe and less on the United States. The Brazilian government believes that De la Rua
is more pro-MERCOSUR than Menem. They are also encouraged that the incoming
government will handle the Oviedo issue differently and hope that relations between
Argentina and Paraguay can normalize. This is key, according to a high-ranking
Brazilian functionary, because he believes that the discord between Menem and Gonzilez
Macchi has given the bloc a negative impression to the international community.23 In
any case, with cautious optimism MERCOSUR prepares to enter a new era in its
development.
CONCLUSION
The central question of the 2 1st century has become: will the nations of
Latin American define their security in strictly national terms? Or in
terms which take advantage of, or require some measure of, regional
cooperation or integration? 32 4
322 Mario Osava, Raul Ronzoni and Gustavo Gonzalez, Inter Press Service, 10-26-99. Argentina:
President-elect welcomed by MERCOSUR partners.
323 La Naci6n, 09-11-99. Brasil prefiere quedarse al margen.
324 Tulchin, 1997: 39.
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This thesis asks what and the MERCOSUR case in general, and the Paraguayan
case in particular, tell us about the relationship between economic integration and
security cooperation. The central question asked whether a causative relationship exists
from the economic side of integration onto the security dimension. In light of the
evidence that has been presented, it appears that this assumption requires some
qualification. To state that the integrative flow necessarily goes from the economic arena
to the security sphere depends in fact on which region or bloc one analyses. In the case
of the European Union, which was briefly discussed in the first chapter, other institutions
such as NATO had, during the Cold War, played the predominant security role in the
region. Even after the ending of the Cold War, NATO continued to be the primary
international interlocutor in security issues, as evidenced in the U.S. role in the both
Balkan wars. Yet, the Europeanist logic has gained currency as witnessed by the 1993
Maastricht Treaty, which called for the EU to play more of a political and security role in
this new international context. Still, the EU and even the WEU continued playing minor
roles in this sphere, and the idea of applying supranationality to security issues was seen
as being too much of an impingement on the sovereignty of these nations. Only very
recently has the idea of a stronger EU role in security issues become a reality, in the sense
that it plans to move away from the U.S. sphere of influence, and admits some loss of
sovereignty on the part of its members. As was pointed out in the first chapter, beginning
next year there will be a security czar who will speak for fifteen European countries, who
will be backed by a stronger WEU force in case of future occurrences like the Kosovo
crisis. Is this case proof that economic integration has led to common security in that
region? Or is it proof that the end of the Cold War has altered and redefined the global
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strategic environment? I believe the latter is the case due to two reasons. First, the U.S.
is in the process of diminishing its global military presence and wants other countries and
regional actors to step up their efforts to defend their own interests instead of simply
depending on the U.S. to bail them out. This is not to suggest that the U.S. wants to
redefine its hegemonic role, but that it no longer has the resources nor the will to become
involved in every international crisis, only the ones that it views are in its national
security interests. Second, the United Nations, while a leader in global multilateral
action, has recently voiced its desire for regional actors to play a bigger role in resolving
dilemmas within their regions. Both the U.S and U.N. continue to lead global
multilateral initiatives, but are encouraging more regional action and less dependence on
their leadership, and more importantly, their resources.
In the case of ASEAN (a regional arrangement more comparable to MERCOSUR
since its members are developing countries and it is a sub-regional arrangement),
increased economic interaction was the justifying component of this organization while
the real raison d'etre was covert cooperation in security and political issues. Based on
that, it cannot be argued that economic integration led to security cooperation in ASEAN
either. The economic logic to integrate was there before the end of the Cold War. This
was not the case in the politico-security realm. With the end of the Cold War, and its
backdrop of capitalism versus communism over, these nations can more openly engage in
security dialogues. The catalyst appears to be the ending of the Cold War, and not
regional economic organizations. The latter provided the essential institution building
and networking processes that facilitate interaction in other dimensions, but the strategic
redefinition was not possible without the ending of the Cold War.
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The MERCOSUR case is complex. These countries are undergoing democratic
transitions that are distinct and in different stages. It would be easy to argue that if not
for its MERCOSUR membership, Paraguay would have fallen back to authoritarianism
either in 1996 or in 1999, even though the U.S. and the OAS would have never permitted
that. Still the involvement of its main partners, Argentina and Brazil, has been defining
to the transition process this country is undergoing. Cubas is in Brazil, and Oviedo, who
is the real power holder, is in Argentina. The members of MERCOSUR, an economic
organization, intervened in two critical institutional crises in this country and democracy
was preserved. It is tempting to say that the democratic clause has been a great success
and Paraguay is the proof. It is also tempting to argue that this case shows that in the
Southern Cone, economic integration has resulted in security cooperation, and
intervention when necessary. Yet, I believe that MERCOSUR is not so much an
economic organization as it is a political union based on an imperfect customs union.
The gains of forming this customs union with a CET are evidenced from the
impressive growth of mutual trade between these countries, especially in the first years of
the organization. This occurred despite hard adjustment costs and poor trade
infrastructure. "But the real motivation for the formation of MERCOSUR has been fear
of other groupings like the BC and NAFTA and the desire to improve bargaining
capacity."' The MERCOSUR is born out of strategic considerations in both Brazil and
Argentina. The MERCOSUR members believe it is in their best interests to integrate, in
great part to improve each country's individual bargaining capacity. With respect to the
application of neo-liberal policies, Gautam Sen offers:
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The underlying economic catalysts of liberalization and its corollary,
globalization, precede the subsequent causative political factor of the
ending of the cold war as a matter of empirical fact. In virtually all cases
the immediate reason for the adoption of liberalization programmes has
been a balance of payments crisis and a collapse of the exchange rate,
usually accompanied by inflation and an unsustainable fiscal deficit.326
Regarding economic integration and security cooperation, we are looking at two
separate processes that have different catalysts. The impulse toward economic
integration has its roots in the process of globalization and its attendant consequences.
The desire and necessity to coordinate foreign policies to combat common threats to
security is derived from the end of the Cold War and the ongoing process of strategic
international redefinition. The two processes are linked in many ways and temper each
other, but are distinct.
When asked whether MERCOSUR will become institutionalized to the point
where a supranational body exists, Argentine Mercosur undersecretary, Ambassador
Alfredo Morelli stated that in the near future this is impossible. He argued that
sovereignty is too important to the member countries. He also proposed that security
issues do not necessarily fall into the realm of an organization that is economic in nature.
When asked what the main sources of conflict were, Morelli stated that difference in size
was the common divisive factor. His argument stems from an economic point of view.
Yet, similar arguments could and have been made from security strategic points of view.
The likelihood of Brazil attaining regional hegemonic status is real, as is the phenomenon
325 Gautam Sen, 1999: 65.
326 Ibid. p. 63.
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of free riding by the smaller nations. Morelli made that point succinctly and I believe it
applies to security issues as much as it does to economic issues.37
I dissent from the view that MERCOSUR is purely an economic organization. If
this were the case, then why do nine Brazilian ministries have direct interests in
Argentina, instead of just the Ministry of Economy and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs?
MERCOSUR is a political project, founded upon economic principles and democracy.
MERCOSUR inserts its members into the global economy, giving themn a stronger voice
in defining the post Cold War security environment of the hemisphere. Despite obvious
competition, these countries have decided that there is no alternative to integration. This
is shown by the fact that a center-left coalition won the presidency in Argentina, and
Mercosur membership was not an issue. Unemployment and crime were important
issues, but with respect to MERCOSUR, the main candidates of that election called for
strengthening the bloc, as well as moving away from the U.S. sphere of influence. In
Uruguay, both presidential candidates that will face off in the November 28 runoff plan
to stay within the parameters of integration. Tabar6 Vasquez, who heads a coalition of
left-leaning parties that includes former Tupamaro guerrillas, if victorious wants to
capitalize on the De la Rda victory and a possible Lagos victory in Chile, who is also on
the left. Argentine Vice-President elect Carlos Alvares of FREPASO stated that "there is
a common agenda in Latin America, and I believe that we, along with Lagos and Tabara
(Vazquez), interpret it in a similar manner. I am talking about how to address the
problems of growth, equality, social equity and greater solidarity."3 2 8 It appears that
327 Interview with Ambassador Alfredo Morelli, 03-20-98.
3 Mario Osava, Raul Ronzoni and Gustavo Gonzalez. Inter Press Service, 10-26-99. Argentina:
President-elect welcomed by ME RCOSUR partners.
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while the emphasis on what problems predominate is tempered by ideology, all see
cooperation as part of the solution.
In light of the trends that were pointed out in the second chapter, namely the
militarization of policing functions, there are serious challenges to the region. Neo-
liberal economic policies have brought on macroeconomic fiscal stability, but have
resulted in the further impoverishment of the poor and increased unemployment. This
has resulted in an increase in crime in every country, including Uruguay. As has been
implemented in Brazil and Paraguay and has had serious proposals in Argentina, the
Uruguayan government has flirted with the idea of providing its military with police
functions to attend to rising crime and police corruption. 32 9 This trend is a result of the
inability of the state in the present neo-liberal context to protect its populace. Thus, the
government turns to the military when crime becomes overwhelming, as happened in
Brazil in 1994 and 1995, while middle and upper class society purchase private security.
We cannot forget that there is an Argentine project that proposes to give private security
officers 'limited' policing functions. Could we be headed toward the privatization of the
traditional security role of the state as well? This question goes beyond this research but
is worthy of further analysis.
There is often little agreement between the U.S. and its Latin American
counterparts on the nature of what constitute common threats and even less on their
resolution. While the U.S. continues to dominate in these issue areas, it has also
portrayed an interest in lessening its international role while promoting multilateral action
by regional actors. This policy is backed by proposals of this nature by the United
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Nations at the global level, and by the OAS in the Western Hemisphere. As the US role
diminishes, it is becoming clear that other actors attempt to fill this void. In my view, in
the Southern Cone, Brazil and, to a lesser extent, Argentina through their efforts during
the Paraguayan crises have shown an inclination at playing a much greater regional role
to fill the vacuum that a US retreat would leave. It may be the case that the ability for
Latin American states to control, or inhibit, the individual actions of the U.S. will depend
upon the their ability to cooperate with one another in regional or sub-regional groups.330
Mack and Ravenhill propose:
In the increasingly interdependent world of the 1990s, international
'regimes' have grown rapidly in number, in scope and in importance.
They have evolved because policy-makers recognize that there are fewer
and fewer unilateral solutions to the problems they confront across a range
of foreign policy issue areas and thus there is an ever-increasing need for
multilateral cooperation.331
This appears to be the case in the Southern Cone as one witnesses the
developments that have been pointed out. It is also becoming apparent that the national
territory can no longer be considered to be the only point of reference for the needs of
nation-states in their security concerns.332 "It needs to be made clear that strategic
cooperation in security matters must implicate the predominance of civil authority over
that of the military "333  The global and regional parameters have changed. "For
developing nations, integrating with their neighbors may be the only viable manner in
which they can insert themselves into the global economic and political context, and may
329 Clarin, 07-29-97. Daran tareas policiales a las FF.AA. uruguayas.
330 Tulchin, 1997: 39-40.
331 Mack and Ravenhill, 1995: 1. They define regime as those multilateral arrangements that are created to
facilitate international cooperation. Ibid.
32 Ambler Moss, 1995: 15.
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improve each country's bargaining position in dealing with more powerful countries and
blocs."3 3 Given this, I believe that this project has shown that a causative relationship
does not necessarily exist between economic integration and security cooperation. Yet,
this research has shown that these two processes are linked and temper each other on a
procedural basis. When commercial relations are going well, there is higher likelihood
that cooperation in the security arena will occur, and vice versa. Both processes are
based on multilateral action in order to attain common economic and social goals and to
combat common threats, this in the ambit of competition of course. Both processes are a
response to global phenomena in the economic and security spheres. Thus, the
correlation is obvious, as is the fact that these projects are based at the regional level.
"Within a region there are some economies of scale and some possibilities for protection
against the more merciless aspects of global competition."3 3 Barry Buzan offers:
The relevance of all of this for regional security complexes is, of course,
that it makes a big difference whether the structure of the international
political economy runs in line with, or against, the structure of the security
order. But if the international political economy regionalizes as well, then
the two patterns can reinforce each other, tending both to raise the overall
importance of the regional level, and to insulate regions from each
other. 336
I believe that this statement very well applies to the integration project that the
Southern Cone countries are currently undergoing and brings us back to a key issue. In
order to attenuate future commercial disputes, it may greatly benefit the MERCOSUR to
implement a supranational body. This should improve the bloc's bargaining capacity in
33 Ibid. p. 17.
'4 Puchala, 1974: 179-180.
33 Barry Buzan, 1995: 143.
336 Ibid. p. 144.
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the global scene. Lastly, in light of the correlation between economic and security issues,
I contend that with the further institutionalization of MERCOSUR, the progress toward
democratization and economic competitiveness will be consolidated, and the negative
repercussions of the weakening state may finally be resolved.
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